Rule Library

Sigma Rules

1,414 rules found for "Nextron Systems"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionmediumtest

MsiExec Web Install

Detects suspicious msiexec process starts with web addresses as parameter

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Feb 09windows
Detectionlowexperimental

Windows MSIX Package Support Framework AI_STUBS Execution

Detects execution of Advanced Installer MSIX Package Support Framework (PSF) components, specifically AI_STUBS executables with original filename 'popupwrapper.exe'. This activity may indicate malicious MSIX packages build with Advanced Installer leveraging the Package Support Framework to bypass application control restrictions.

WindowsProcess Creation
Michael Haag+1Mon Nov 03windows
Detectionmediumtest

Arbitrary File Download Via MSOHTMED.EXE

Detects usage of "MSOHTMED" to download arbitrary files

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 19windows
Detectionmediumtest

Arbitrary File Download Via MSPUB.EXE

Detects usage of "MSPUB" (Microsoft Publisher) to download arbitrary files

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 19windows
Detectioncriticaltest

Suspicious Child Process Of Veeam Dabatase

Detects suspicious child processes of the Veeam service process. This could indicate potential RCE or SQL Injection.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu May 04windows
Detectionhightest

Potential MSTSC Shadowing Activity

Detects RDP session hijacking by using MSTSC shadowing

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Jan 24windows
Detectionlowtest

Mstsc.EXE Execution With Local RDP File

Detects potential RDP connection via Mstsc using a local ".rdp" file

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Apr 18windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Mstsc.EXE Execution With Local RDP File

Detects potential RDP connection via Mstsc using a local ".rdp" file located in suspicious locations.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Apr 18windows
Detectionhightest

Mstsc.EXE Execution From Uncommon Parent

Detects potential RDP connection via Mstsc using a local ".rdp" file located in suspicious locations.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Apr 18windows
Detectionmediumtest

Firewall Rule Update Via Netsh.EXE

Detects execution of netsh with the "advfirewall" and the "set" option in order to set new values for properties of a existing rule

WindowsProcess Creation
X__Junior (Nextron Systems)Tue Jul 18windows
Detectionmediumtest

New Port Forwarding Rule Added Via Netsh.EXE

Detects the execution of netsh commands that configure a new port forwarding (PortProxy) rule

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+3Tue Jan 29windows
Detectionhightest

RDP Port Forwarding Rule Added Via Netsh.EXE

Detects the execution of netsh to configure a port forwarding of port 3389 (RDP) rule

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Jan 29windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Group And Account Reconnaissance Activity Using Net.EXE

Detects suspicious reconnaissance command line activity on Windows systems using Net.EXE Check if the user that executed the commands is suspicious (e.g. service accounts, LOCAL_SYSTEM)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+2Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionlowtest

Stop Windows Service Via Net.EXE

Detects the stopping of a Windows service via the "net" utility.

WindowsProcess Creation
Jakob Weinzettl+2Sun Mar 05windows
Detectionhightest

New User Created Via Net.EXE With Never Expire Option

Detects creation of local users via the net.exe command with the option "never expire"

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Jul 12windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Manipulation Of Default Accounts Via Net.EXE

Detects suspicious manipulations of default accounts such as 'administrator' and 'guest'. For example 'enable' or 'disable' accounts or change the password...etc

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Sep 01windows
Detectionhightest

Windows Internet Hosted WebDav Share Mount Via Net.EXE

Detects when an internet hosted webdav share is mounted using the "net.exe" utility

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Feb 21windows
Detectionlowtest

Windows Share Mount Via Net.EXE

Detects when a share is mounted using the "net.exe" utility

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Feb 02windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Arbitrary Code Execution Via Node.EXE

Detects the execution node.exe which is shipped with multiple software such as VMware, Adobe...etc. In order to execute arbitrary code. For example to establish reverse shell as seen in Log4j attacks...etc

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Sep 09windows
Detectionmediumtest

Node Process Executions

Detects the execution of other scripts using the Node executable packaged with Adobe Creative Cloud

WindowsProcess Creation
Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)Wed Apr 06windows
Detectionhightest

Network Reconnaissance Activity

Detects a set of suspicious network related commands often used in recon stages

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Feb 07windows
Detectionmediumtest

Nslookup PowerShell Download Cradle - ProcessCreation

Detects suspicious powershell download cradle using nslookup. This cradle uses nslookup to extract payloads from DNS records

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Sep 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Usage Of Active Directory Diagnostic Tool (ntdsutil.exe)

Detects execution of ntdsutil.exe to perform different actions such as restoring snapshots...etc.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Sep 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Driver/DLL Installation Via Odbcconf.EXE

Detects execution of "odbcconf" with "INSTALLDRIVER" which installs a new ODBC driver. Attackers abuse this to install and run malicious DLLs.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon May 22windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Driver/DLL Installation Via Odbcconf.EXE

Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "INSTALLDRIVER" action where the driver doesn't contain a ".dll" extension. This is often used as a defense evasion method.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue May 23windows
Detectionhightest

Odbcconf.EXE Suspicious DLL Location

Detects execution of "odbcconf" where the path of the DLL being registered is located in a potentially suspicious location.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon May 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

New DLL Registered Via Odbcconf.EXE

Detects execution of "odbcconf" with "REGSVR" in order to register a new DLL (equivalent to running regsvr32). Attackers abuse this to install and run malicious DLLs.

WindowsProcess Creation
Kirill Kiryanov+4Mon May 22windows
Detectionhightest

Potentially Suspicious DLL Registered Via Odbcconf.EXE

Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "REGSVR" action where the DLL in question doesn't contain a ".dll" extension. Which is often used as a method to evade defenses.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon May 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Response File Execution Via Odbcconf.EXE

Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "-f" flag in order to load a response file which might contain a malicious action.

WindowsProcess Creation
Kirill Kiryanov+4Mon May 22windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Response File Execution Via Odbcconf.EXE

Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "-f" flag in order to load a response file with a non-".rsp" extension.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon May 22windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Arbitrary File Download Using Office Application

Detects potential arbitrary file download using a Microsoft Office application

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+2Tue May 17windows
Detectionhightest

Potentially Suspicious Office Document Executed From Trusted Location

Detects the execution of an Office application that points to a document that is located in a trusted location. Attackers often used this to avoid macro security and execute their malicious code.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Jun 21windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Microsoft OneNote Child Process

Detects suspicious child processes of the Microsoft OneNote application. This may indicate an attempt to execute malicious embedded objects from a .one file.

WindowsProcess Creation
Tim Rauch+2Fri Oct 21windows
Detectionhightest

Outlook EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Setting Enabled

Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to run applications or execute macros

WindowsProcess Creation
Markus Neis+1Thu Dec 27windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Execution From Outlook Temporary Folder

Detects a suspicious program execution in Outlook temp folder

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Oct 01windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Outlook Child Process

Detects a suspicious process spawning from an Outlook process.

WindowsProcess Creation
Michael Haag+4Mon Feb 28windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Remote Child Process From Outlook

Detects a suspicious child process spawning from Outlook where the image is located in a remote location (SMB/WebDav shares).

WindowsProcess Creation
Markus Neis+1Thu Dec 27windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process

Detects a suspicious process spawning from one of the Microsoft Office suite products (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio, etc.)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+7Fri Apr 06windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Execution Of PDQDeployRunner

Detects suspicious execution of "PDQDeployRunner" which is part of the PDQDeploy service stack that is responsible for executing commands and packages on a remote machines

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Jul 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Perl Inline Command Execution

Detects execution of perl using the "-e"/"-E" flags. This is could be used as a way to launch a reverse shell or execute live perl code.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jan 02windows
Detectionmediumtest

Php Inline Command Execution

Detects execution of php using the "-r" flag. This is could be used as a way to launch a reverse shell or execute live php code.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jan 02windows
Detectionhightest

Ping Hex IP

Detects a ping command that uses a hex encoded IP address

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Mar 23windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Plink Port Forwarding

Detects suspicious Plink tunnel port forwarding to a local port

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Jan 19windows
Detectionhightest

Potential RDP Tunneling Via Plink

Execution of plink to perform data exfiltration and tunneling

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Aug 04windows
Detectionhightest

AADInternals PowerShell Cmdlets Execution - ProccessCreation

Detects ADDInternals Cmdlet execution. A tool for administering Azure AD and Office 365. Which can be abused by threat actors to attack Azure AD or Office 365.

WindowsProcess Creation
Austin Songer+2Fri Dec 23windows
Detectionmediumtest

Add Windows Capability Via PowerShell Cmdlet

Detects usage of the "Add-WindowsCapability" cmdlet to add Windows capabilities. Notable capabilities could be "OpenSSH" and others.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Sun Jan 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential AMSI Bypass Using NULL Bits

Detects usage of special strings/null bits in order to potentially bypass AMSI functionalities

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Jan 04windows
Detectionmediumtest

Audio Capture via PowerShell

Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet.

WindowsProcess Creation
E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections+3Thu Oct 24windows