Rule Library

Sigma Rules

193 rules found for "lateral-movement"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionlowtest

Access To ADMIN$ Network Share

Detects access to ADMIN$ network share

Windowssecurity
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Mar 04windows
Detectionhightest

Hacktool Ruler

This events that are generated when using the hacktool Ruler by Sensepost

Windowssecurity
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed May 31windows
Detectionmediumtest

Remote Task Creation via ATSVC Named Pipe

Detects remote task creation via at.exe or API interacting with ATSVC namedpipe

Windowssecurity
Samir BousseadenWed Apr 03windows
Detectionhightest

CobaltStrike Service Installations - Security

Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement

Windowssecurity
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Wed May 26windows
Detectionmediumtest

DCERPC SMB Spoolss Named Pipe

Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machine that has the spoolservice enabled.

Windowssecurity
OTR (Open Threat Research)Wed Nov 28windows
Detectionhightest

DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Iertutil DLL Hijack - Security

Detects a threat actor creating a file named `iertutil.dll` in the `C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\` directory over the network for a DCOM InternetExplorer DLL Hijack scenario.

Windowssecurity
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionlowtest

External Disk Drive Or USB Storage Device Was Recognized By The System

Detects external disk drives or plugged-in USB devices.

Windowssecurity
Keith WrightWed Nov 20windows
Detectionhightest

Persistence and Execution at Scale via GPO Scheduled Task

Detect lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, usually used to deploy ransomware at scale

Windowssecurity
Samir BousseadenWed Apr 03windows
Detectionhightest

Impacket PsExec Execution

Detects execution of Impacket's psexec.py.

Windowssecurity
Bhabesh RajMon Dec 14windows
Detectionhightest

First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe

This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes

Windowssecurity
Samir BousseadenWed Apr 03windows
Detectionhightest

Metasploit SMB Authentication

Alerts on Metasploit host's authentications on the domain.

Windowssecurity
Chakib Gzenayi+1Wed May 06windows
Detectionhightest

Metasploit Or Impacket Service Installation Via SMB PsExec

Detects usage of Metasploit SMB PsExec (exploit/windows/smb/psexec) and Impacket psexec.py by triggering on specific service installation

Windowssecurity
Bartlomiej Czyz+1Thu Jan 21windows
Detectionmediumtest

Denied Access To Remote Desktop

This event is generated when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop. Often, this event can be generated by attackers when searching for available windows servers in the network.

Windowssecurity
Pushkarev DmitrySat Jun 27windows
Detectionhightest

Protected Storage Service Access

Detects access to a protected_storage service over the network. Potential abuse of DPAPI to extract domain backup keys from Domain Controllers

Windowssecurity
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)Sat Aug 10windows
Detectionhightest

RDP over Reverse SSH Tunnel WFP

Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback address

Windowssecurity
Samir BousseadenSat Feb 16windows
Detectionhightest

Register new Logon Process by Rubeus

Detects potential use of Rubeus via registered new trusted logon process

Windowssecurity
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+2Thu Oct 24windows
Detectionhightest

SMB Create Remote File Admin Share

Look for non-system accounts SMB accessing a file with write (0x2) access mask via administrative share (i.e C$).

Windowssecurity
Jose Rodriguez+1Thu Aug 06windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Remote Logon with Explicit Credentials

Detects suspicious processes logging on with explicit credentials

Windowssecurity
oscd.community+3Mon Oct 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Uncommon Outbound Kerberos Connection - Security

Detects uncommon outbound network activity via Kerberos default port indicating possible lateral movement or first stage PrivEsc via delegation.

Windowssecurity
Ilyas Ochkov+1Thu Oct 24windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious PsExec Execution

detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one

Windowssecurity
Samir BousseadenWed Apr 03windows
Detectionmediumtest

Remote Service Activity via SVCCTL Named Pipe

Detects remote service activity via remote access to the svcctl named pipe

Windowssecurity
Samir BousseadenWed Apr 03windows
Detectionhightest

User Couldn't Call a Privileged Service 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess'

The 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess' function verifies that the application making the function call is a logon process by checking that it has the SeTcbPrivilege privilege set. Possible Rubeus tries to get a handle to LSA.

Windowssecurity
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+2Thu Oct 24windows
Detectionhightest

T1047 Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack

Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.

Windowssecurity
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

Unsigned or Unencrypted SMB Connection to Share Established

Detects SMB server connections to shares without signing or encryption enabled. This could indicate potential lateral movement activity using unsecured SMB shares.

Windowssmbserver-connectivity
Mohamed AbdelghaniSun Oct 19windows
Detectionmediumtest

NTLMv1 Logon Between Client and Server

Detects the reporting of NTLMv1 being used between a client and server. NTLMv1 is insecure as the underlying encryption algorithms can be brute-forced by modern hardware.

Windowssystem
Tim Shelton+1Tue Apr 26windows
Detectioncriticalstable

Zerologon Exploitation Using Well-known Tools

This rule is designed to detect attempts to exploit Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) vulnerability using mimikatz zerologon module or other exploits from machine with "kali" hostname.

Windowssystem
Demyan Sokolin+2Tue Oct 13windows
Detectioncriticaltest

CobaltStrike Service Installations - System

Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement

Windowssystem
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Wed May 26windows
Detectionhightest

smbexec.py Service Installation

Detects the use of smbexec.py tool by detecting a specific service installation

Windowssystem
Omer Faruk CelikTue Mar 20windows
Detectionhightest

PSExec and WMI Process Creations Block

Detects blocking of process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands

Windowswindefend
Bhabesh RajTue Jul 14windows
Detectionhightest

Mimikatz Use

This method detects mimikatz keywords in different Eventlogs (some of them only appear in older Mimikatz version that are however still used by different threat groups)

Windows
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Jan 10windows
Detectionlowexperimental

DNS Query Request By QuickAssist.EXE

Detects DNS queries initiated by "QuickAssist.exe" to Microsoft Quick Assist primary endpoint that is used to establish a session.

WindowsDNS Query
Muhammad FaisalThu Dec 19windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

Potentially Suspicious File Creation by OpenEDR's ITSMService

Detects the creation of potentially suspicious files by OpenEDR's ITSMService process. The ITSMService is responsible for remote management operations and can create files on the system through the Process Explorer or file management features. While legitimate for IT operations, creation of executable or script files could indicate unauthorized file uploads, data staging, or malicious file deployment.

WindowsFile Event
kostastsaleThu Feb 19windows
Detectionmediumtest

Creation Of Non-Existent System DLL

Detects creation of specific system DLL files that are usually not present on the system (or at least not in system directories) but may be loaded by legitimate processes. Phantom DLL hijacking involves placing malicious DLLs with names of non-existent system binaries in locations where legitimate applications may search for them, leading to execution of the malicious DLLs. Thus, the creation of such DLLs may indicate preparation for phantom DLL hijacking attacks.

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Thu Dec 01windows
Detectioncriticaltest

Potential DCOM InternetExplorer.Application DLL Hijack

Detects potential DLL hijack of "iertutil.dll" found in the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Class over the network

WindowsFile Event
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+2Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionhighexperimental

HackTool - NetExec File Indicators

Detects file creation events indicating NetExec (nxc.exe) execution on the local machine. NetExec is a PyInstaller-bundled binary that extracts its embedded data files to a "_MEI<random>" directory under the Temp folder upon execution. Files dropped under the "\nxc\" sub-directory of that extraction path are unique to NetExec and serve as reliable on-disk indicators of execution. NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation and lateral movement tool used for Active Directory enumeration, credential harvesting, and remote code execution.

WindowsFile Event
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Wed Apr 08windows
Detectionhightest

PSEXEC Remote Execution File Artefact

Detects creation of the PSEXEC key file. Which is created anytime a PsExec command is executed. It gets written to the file system and will be recorded in the USN Journal on the target system

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Sat Jan 21windows
Detectioncriticaltest

Wmiexec Default Output File

Detects the creation of the default output filename used by the wmiexec tool

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jun 02windows
Detectioncriticaltest

Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack - File

Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.

WindowsFile Event
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionmediumtest

Writing Local Admin Share

Aversaries may use to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). This technique is used by post-exploitation frameworks.

WindowsFile Event
François HubautSat Jan 01windows
Detectioncriticaltest

Potential DCOM InternetExplorer.Application DLL Hijack - Image Load

Detects potential DLL hijack of "iertutil.dll" found in the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Class

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+2Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionmediumtest

WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers Activity Via Scrcons.EXE DLL Load

Detects signs of the WMI script host process "scrcons.exe" loading scripting DLLs which could indicates WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers EventConsumers activity.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Wed Sep 02windows
Detectionhightest

Potential DLL Sideloading Of Non-Existent DLLs From System Folders

Detects loading of specific system DLL files that are usually not present on the system (or at least not in system directories) but may be loaded by legitimate processes, potentially indicating phantom DLL hijacking attempts. Phantom DLL hijacking involves placing malicious DLLs with names of non-existent system binaries in locations where legitimate applications may search for them, leading to execution of the malicious DLLs.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Dec 09windows
Detectionhighexperimental

BaaUpdate.exe Suspicious DLL Load

Detects BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) loading DLLs from suspicious locations that are publicly writable which could indicate an attempt to lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking. This technique abuses COM Classes configured as INTERACTIVE USER to spawn processes in the context of the logged-on user's session. Specifically, it targets the BDEUILauncher Class (CLSID ab93b6f1-be76-4185-a488-a9001b105b94) which can launch BaaUpdate.exe, which is vulnerable to COM Hijacking when started with input parameters. This allows attackers to execute code in the user's context without needing to steal credentials or use additional techniques to compromise the account.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Sat Oct 18windows
Detectionhightest

Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack

Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious WSMAN Provider Image Loads

Detects signs of potential use of the WSMAN provider from uncommon processes locally and remote execution.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Wed Jun 24windows
Detectionhightest

Outbound RDP Connections Over Non-Standard Tools

Detects Non-Standard tools initiating a connection over port 3389 indicating possible lateral movement. An initial baseline is required before using this utility to exclude third party RDP tooling that you might use.

WindowsNetwork Connection
Markus NeisWed May 15windows
Detectionhightest

RDP Over Reverse SSH Tunnel

Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback address and on TCP port 3389

WindowsNetwork Connection
Samir BousseadenSat Feb 16windows
Detectionhightest

RDP to HTTP or HTTPS Target Ports

Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating to target systems on TCP port 80 or 443

WindowsNetwork Connection
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Apr 29windows