Rule Library

Sigma Rules

1,414 rules found for "Nextron Systems"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionhightest

Renamed AutoIt Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed AutoIt2.exe or AutoIt3.exe. AutoIt is a scripting language and automation tool for Windows systems. While primarily used for legitimate automation tasks, it can be misused in cyber attacks. Attackers can leverage AutoIt to create and distribute malware, including keyloggers, spyware, and botnets. A renamed AutoIt executable is particularly suspicious.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sun Jun 04windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Defense Evasion Via Rename Of Highly Relevant Binaries

Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName datapoint.

WindowsProcess Creation
Matthew Green+2Sat Jun 15windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed BrowserCore.EXE Execution

Detects process creation with a renamed BrowserCore.exe (used to extract Azure tokens)

WindowsProcess Creation
Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)Thu Jun 02windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed Cloudflared.EXE Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed "cloudflared" binary.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Dec 20windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed CreateDump Utility Execution

Detects uses of a renamed legitimate createdump.exe LOLOBIN utility to dump process memory

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Sep 20windows
Detectionmediumtest

Renamed CURL.EXE Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed "CURL.exe" binary based on the PE metadata fields

WindowsProcess Creation
X__Junior (Nextron Systems)Mon Sep 11windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed ZOHO Dctask64 Execution

Detects a renamed "dctask64.exe" execution, a signed binary by ZOHO Corporation part of ManageEngine Endpoint Central. This binary can be abused for DLL injection, arbitrary command and process execution.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Jan 28windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed Gpg.EXE Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed "gpg.exe". Often used by ransomware and loaders to decrypt/encrypt data.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Wed Aug 09windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed Mavinject.EXE Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed version of the "Mavinject" process. Which can be abused to perform process injection using the "/INJECTRUNNING" flag

WindowsProcess Creation
François Hubaut+1Mon Dec 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Renamed Microsoft Teams Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed Microsoft Teams binary.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Jul 12windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed NetSupport RAT Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed "client32.exe" (NetSupport RAT) via Imphash, Product and OriginalFileName strings

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Sep 19windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed NirCmd.EXE Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed "NirCmd.exe" binary based on the PE metadata fields.

WindowsProcess Creation
X__Junior (Nextron Systems)Mon Mar 11windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed Office Binary Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed office binary

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Dec 20windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed PAExec Execution

Detects execution of renamed version of PAExec. Often used by attackers

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Sat May 22windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed PingCastle Binary Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed "PingCastle" binary based on the PE metadata fields.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Thu Jan 11windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed Plink Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed version of the Plink binary

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jun 06windows
Detectionmediumtest

Visual Studio NodejsTools PressAnyKey Renamed Execution

Detects renamed execution of "Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.exe", which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute arbitrary binaries

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Apr 11windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Renamed Rundll32 Execution

Detects when 'DllRegisterServer' is called in the commandline and the image is not rundll32. This could mean that the 'rundll32' utility has been renamed in order to avoid detection

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Renamed Remote Utilities RAT (RURAT) Execution

Detects execution of renamed Remote Utilities (RURAT) via Product PE header field

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Sep 19windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Renamed Schtasks Execution

Detects the execution of renamed schtasks.exe binary, which is a legitimate Windows utility used for scheduling tasks. One of the very common persistence techniques is schedule malicious tasks using schtasks.exe. Since, it is heavily abused, it is also heavily monitored by security products. To evade detection, threat actors may rename the schtasks.exe binary to schedule their malicious tasks.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Thu Nov 27windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed SysInternals DebugView Execution

Detects suspicious renamed SysInternals DebugView execution

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu May 28windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed ProcDump Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed ProcDump executable. This often done by attackers or malware in order to evade defensive mechanisms.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Nov 18windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed PsExec Service Execution

Detects suspicious launch of a renamed version of the PSEXESVC service with, which is not often used by legitimate administrators

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 21windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed Sysinternals Sdelete Execution

Detects the use of a renamed SysInternals Sdelete, which is something an administrator shouldn't do (the renaming)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Sep 06windows
Detectioncriticaltest

Renamed Whoami Execution

Detects the execution of whoami that has been renamed to a different name to avoid detection

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Aug 12windows
Detectionmediumtest

Ruby Inline Command Execution

Detects execution of ruby using the "-e" flag. This is could be used as a way to launch a reverse shell or execute live ruby code.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jan 02windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Advpack Call Via Rundll32.EXE

Detects execution of "rundll32" calling "advpack.dll" with potential obfuscated ordinal calls in order to leverage the "RegisterOCX" function

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Wed May 17windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Rundll32 Invoking Inline VBScript

Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that invokes inline VBScript as seen being used by UNC2452

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Mar 05windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Key Manager Access

Detects the invocation of the Stored User Names and Passwords dialogue (Key Manager)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Apr 21windows
Detectionhightest

Mshtml.DLL RunHTMLApplication Suspicious Usage

Detects execution of commands that leverage the "mshtml.dll" RunHTMLApplication export to run arbitrary code via different protocol handlers (vbscript, javascript, file, http...)

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+4Sun Aug 14windows
Detectionhightest

Rundll32 Execution Without CommandLine Parameters

Detects suspicious start of rundll32.exe without any parameters as found in CobaltStrike beacon activity

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu May 27windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Obfuscated Ordinal Call Via Rundll32

Detects execution of "rundll32" with potential obfuscated ordinal calls

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Wed May 17windows
Detectionhightest

Process Memory Dump Via Comsvcs.DLL

Detects a process memory dump via "comsvcs.dll" using rundll32, covering multiple different techniques (ordinal, minidump function, etc.)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+3Tue Feb 18windows
Detectionhightest

Shell32 DLL Execution in Suspicious Directory

Detects shell32.dll executing a DLL in a suspicious directory

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Wed Nov 24windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential ShellDispatch.DLL Functionality Abuse

Detects potential "ShellDispatch.dll" functionality abuse to execute arbitrary binaries via "ShellExecute"

WindowsProcess Creation
X__Junior (Nextron Systems)Tue Jun 20windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Rundll32 Activity

Detects suspicious execution of rundll32, with specific calls to some DLLs with known LOLBIN functionalities

WindowsProcess Creation
juju4+3Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Control Panel DLL Load

Detects suspicious Rundll32 execution from control.exe as used by Equation Group and Exploit Kits

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Apr 15windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Usage Of ShellExec_RunDLL

Detects suspicious usage of the ShellExec_RunDLL function to launch other commands as seen in the the raspberry-robin attack

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Sep 01windows
Detectionhighstable

ShimCache Flush

Detects actions that clear the local ShimCache and remove forensic evidence

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Feb 01windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Rundll32 Activity Invoking Sys File

Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that includes a *.sys file as seen being used by UNC2452

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Mar 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Rundll32 Execution With Uncommon DLL Extension

Detects the execution of rundll32 with a command line that doesn't contain a common extension

WindowsProcess Creation
Tim Shelton+2Thu Jan 13windows
Detectionhightest

Rundll32 UNC Path Execution

Detects rundll32 execution where the DLL is located on a remote location (share)

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Aug 10windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious WebDav Client Execution Via Rundll32.EXE

Detects "svchost.exe" spawning "rundll32.exe" with command arguments like C:\windows\system32\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie. This could be an indicator of exfiltration or use of WebDav to launch code (hosted on WebDav Server) or potentially a sign of exploitation of CVE-2023-23397

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Thu Mar 16windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Schtasks Execution AppData Folder

Detects the creation of a schtask that executes a file from C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local

WindowsProcess Creation
Martin Mueller+1Tue Mar 15windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Modification Of Scheduled Tasks

Detects when an attacker tries to modify an already existing scheduled tasks to run from a suspicious location Attackers can create a simple looking task in order to avoid detection on creation as it's often the most focused on Instead they modify the task after creation to include their malicious payload

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 28windows
Detectionlowtest

Scheduled Task Creation Via Schtasks.EXE

Detects the creation of scheduled tasks by user accounts via the "schtasks" utility.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation Involving Temp Folder

Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that involves a temporary folder and runs only once

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Mar 11windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

Scheduled Task Creation with Curl and PowerShell Execution Combo

Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe, potentially in combination with curl for downloading payloads and PowerShell for executing them. This facilitates executing malicious payloads or connecting with C&C server persistently without dropping the malware sample on the host.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Wed Feb 05windows