Rule Library

Sigma Rules

125 rules found for "The DFIR Report"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionmediumtest

LOLBIN Execution From Abnormal Drive

Detects LOLBINs executing from an abnormal or uncommon drive such as a mounted ISO.

WindowsProcess Creation
Christopher Peacock+3Tue Jan 25windows
Detectionmediumtest

Registry Modification of MS-settings Protocol Handler

Detects registry modifications to the 'ms-settings' protocol handler, which is frequently targeted for UAC bypass or persistence. Attackers can modify this registry to execute malicious code with elevated privileges by hijacking the command execution path.

WindowsProcess Creation
François Hubaut+1Mon Dec 20windows
Detectionmediumtest

Process Creation Using Sysnative Folder

Detects process creation events that use the Sysnative folder (common for CobaltStrike spawns)

WindowsProcess Creation
Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)Tue Aug 23windows
Detectionmediumtest

Weak or Abused Passwords In CLI

Detects weak passwords or often abused passwords (seen used by threat actors) via the CLI. An example would be a threat actor creating a new user via the net command and providing the password inline

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Sep 14windows
Detectionhightest

Wab Execution From Non Default Location

Detects execution of wab.exe (Windows Contacts) and Wabmig.exe (Microsoft Address Book Import Tool) from non default locations as seen with bumblebee activity

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 12windows
Detectionhightest

Wab/Wabmig Unusual Parent Or Child Processes

Detects unusual parent or children of the wab.exe (Windows Contacts) and Wabmig.exe (Microsoft Address Book Import Tool) processes as seen being used with bumblebee activity

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 12windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Product Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of WMIC in order to get a list of firewall and antivirus products

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Feb 14windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious WMIC Execution Via Office Process

Office application called wmic to proxye execution through a LOLBIN process. This is often used to break suspicious parent-child chain (Office app spawns LOLBin).

WindowsProcess Creation
Vadim Khrykov+1Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE

Detects WMIC executing "process call create" with suspicious calls to processes such as "rundll32", "regsrv32", etc.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Tampering With Security Products Via WMIC

Detects uninstallation or termination of security products using the WMIC utility

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Sat Jan 30windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious WmiPrvSE Child Process

Detects suspicious and uncommon child processes of WmiPrvSE

WindowsProcess Creation
Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel)+2Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Dropper Script Execution Via WScript/CScript/MSHTA

Detects wscript/cscript/mshta executions of scripts located in user directories

WindowsProcess Creation
Margaritis Dimitrios+4Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

Delete Defender Scan ShellEx Context Menu Registry Key

Detects deletion of registry key that adds 'Scan with Defender' option in context menu. Attackers may use this to make it harder for users to scan files that are suspicious.

WindowsRegistry Delete
Matt Anderson (Huntress)Fri Jul 11windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Windows Defender Threat Severity Default Action Modified

Detects modifications or creations of Windows Defender's default threat action settings based on severity to 'allow' or take 'no action'. This is a highly suspicious configuration change that effectively disables Defender's ability to automatically mitigate threats of a certain severity level, allowing malicious software to run unimpeded. An attacker might use this technique to bypass defenses before executing payloads.

WindowsRegistry Event
Matt Anderson (Huntress)Fri Jul 11windows
Detectionhightest

Potential AutoLogger Sessions Tampering

Detects tampering with autologger trace sessions which is a technique used by attackers to disable logging. The AutoLogger event tracing session records events up that occur early in the operating system boot process. Applications and device drivers can use the AutoLogger session to capture traces before the user logs in, and also used by security solutions as telemetry source. Adversaries may disable these sessions to evade detection and prevent security monitoring of early boot activities and system events.

WindowsRegistry Set
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 01windows
Detectionhightest

Windows Defender Service Disabled - Registry

Detects when an attacker or tool disables the Windows Defender service (WinDefend) via the registry

WindowsRegistry Set
Ján Trenčanský+3Mon Aug 01windows
Detectionhightest

Hiding User Account Via SpecialAccounts Registry Key

Detects modifications to the registry key "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\Userlist" where the value is set to "0" in order to hide user account from being listed on the logon screen.

WindowsRegistry Set
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Jul 12windows
Detectionhightest

Scheduled TaskCache Change by Uncommon Program

Monitor the creation of a new key under 'TaskCache' when a new scheduled task is registered by a process that is not svchost.exe, which is suspicious

WindowsRegistry Set
Syed HasanFri Jun 18windows
Detectionhightest

Disable Windows Defender Functionalities Via Registry Keys

Detects when attackers or tools disable Windows Defender functionalities via the Windows registry

WindowsRegistry Set
AlertIQ+4Mon Aug 01windows
Emerging Threathightest

Exploitation Attempt Of CVE-2020-1472 - Execution of ZeroLogon PoC

Detects the execution of the commonly used ZeroLogon PoC executable.

WindowsProcess Creation
kostastsale+1Sat Feb 122020
Emerging Threathightest

CVE-2021-44077 POC Default Dropped File

Detects the creation of "msiexec.exe" in the "bin" directory of the ManageEngine SupportCenter Plus (Related to CVE-2021-44077) and public POC available (See references section)

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jun 062021
Emerging Threathightest

Potential CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation Attempt - VMware Horizon

Detects potential initial exploitation attempts against VMware Horizon deployments running a vulnerable versions of Log4j.

WindowsProcess Creation
kostastsaleFri Jan 142021
Emerging Threathightest

Potential Bumblebee Remote Thread Creation

Detects remote thread injection events based on action seen used by bumblebee

WindowsRemote Thread Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Sep 272022
Emerging Threathightest

IcedID Malware Suspicious Single Digit DLL Execution Via Rundll32

Detects RunDLL32.exe executing a single digit DLL named "1.dll" with the export function "DllRegisterServer". This behaviour was often seen used by malware and especially IcedID

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Aug 312023
Emerging Threathightest

Potential CSharp Streamer RAT Loading .NET Executable Image

Detects potential CSharp Streamer RAT loading .NET executable image by using the default file name and path associated with the tool.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Luca Di BartolomeoSat Jun 222024
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Grixba Malware Reconnaissance Activity

Detects execution of the Grixba reconnaissance tool based on suspicious command-line parameter combinations. This tool is used by the Play ransomware group for network enumeration, data gathering, and event log clearing.

WindowsProcess Creation
yxinmiracle+1Wed Nov 262025
Threat Huntmediumtest

Regsvr32.EXE Calling of DllRegisterServer Export Function Implicitly

Detects execution of regsvr32 with the silent flag and no other flags on a DLL located in an uncommon or potentially suspicious location. When Regsvr32 is called in such a way, it implicitly calls the DLL export function 'DllRegisterServer'.

WindowsProcess Creation
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)+1Tue Oct 17windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Rundll32.EXE Calling DllRegisterServer Export Function Explicitly

Detects when the DLL export function 'DllRegisterServer' is called in the commandline by Rundll32 explicitly where the DLL is located in a non-standard path.

WindowsProcess Creation
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)Tue Oct 17windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Detects script file execution (.js, .jse, .vba, .vbe, .vbs, .wsf, .wsh) by Wscript/Cscript.

WindowsProcess Creation
Michael HaagWed Jan 16windows