Rule Library

Sigma Rules

254 rules found for "attack.T1218"

3,707Total
3,116Detection
451Emerging
137Hunting
Detectionhightest

RemoteFXvGPUDisablement Abuse Via AtomicTestHarnesses

Detects calls to the AtomicTestHarnesses "Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand" which is designed to abuse the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary to run custom PowerShell code via module load-order hijacking.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
François HubautTue Jul 13windows
Detectionmediumtest

Arbitrary File Download Via PresentationHost.EXE

Detects usage of "PresentationHost" which is a utility that runs ".xbap" (Browser Applications) files to download arbitrary files

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 19windows
Detectionmediumtest

XBAP Execution From Uncommon Locations Via PresentationHost.EXE

Detects the execution of ".xbap" (Browser Applications) files via PresentationHost.EXE from an uncommon location. These files can be abused to run malicious ".xbap" files any bypass AWL

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Jul 01windows
Detectionmediumtest

Visual Studio NodejsTools PressAnyKey Arbitrary Binary Execution

Detects child processes of Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.exe that can be used to execute any other binary

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionTA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Jan 11windows
Detectionmediumtest

Abusing Print Executable

Attackers can use print.exe for remote file copy

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
Furkan CALISKAN+1Mon Oct 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

File Download Using ProtocolHandler.exe

Detects usage of "ProtocolHandler" to download files. Downloaded files will be located in the cache folder (for example - %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE)

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
François HubautTue Jul 13windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Provlaunch.EXE Binary Proxy Execution Abuse

Detects child processes of "provlaunch.exe" which might indicate potential abuse to proxy execution.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Aug 08windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Provlaunch.EXE Child Process

Detects suspicious child processes of "provlaunch.exe" which might indicate potential abuse to proxy execution.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Aug 08windows
Detectionlowexperimental

RegAsm.EXE Execution Without CommandLine Flags or Files

Detects the execution of "RegAsm.exe" without a commandline flag or file, which might indicate potential process injection activity. Usually "RegAsm.exe" should point to a dedicated DLL file or call the help with the "/?" flag.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.009 · Regsvcs/Regasm
François HubautWed Jun 04windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs With Uncommon Extension

Detects potentially suspicious execution of the Regasm/Regsvcs utilities with an uncommon extension.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.009 · Regsvcs/Regasm
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Feb 13windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs From Uncommon Location

Detects potentially suspicious execution of the Regasm/Regsvcs utilities from a potentially suspicious location

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.009 · Regsvcs/Regasm
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Aug 25windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Provisioning Registry Key Abuse For Binary Proxy Execution

Detects potential abuse of the provisioning registry key for indirect command execution through "Provlaunch.exe".

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Aug 08windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Regsvr32 Commandline Flag Anomaly

Detects a potential command line flag anomaly related to "regsvr32" in which the "/i" flag is used without the "/n" which should be uncommon.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.010 · Regsvr32
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Jul 13windows
Detectionhightest

Potentially Suspicious Regsvr32 HTTP IP Pattern

Detects regsvr32 execution to download and install DLLs located remotely where the address is an IP address.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.010 · Regsvr32
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Jan 11windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Regsvr32 HTTP/FTP Pattern

Detects regsvr32 execution to download/install/register new DLLs that are hosted on Web or FTP servers.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.010 · Regsvr32
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed May 24windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution From Remote Share

Detects REGSVR32.exe to execute DLL hosted on remote shares

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.010 · Regsvr32
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Oct 31windows
Detectionhightest

Potentially Suspicious Child Process Of Regsvr32

Detects potentially suspicious child processes of "regsvr32.exe".

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.010 · Regsvr32
elhoim+2Thu May 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Regsvr32 Execution From Potential Suspicious Location

Detects execution of regsvr32 where the DLL is located in a potentially suspicious location.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.010 · Regsvr32
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri May 26windows
Detectionhightest

Regsvr32 Execution From Highly Suspicious Location

Detects execution of regsvr32 where the DLL is located in a highly suspicious locations

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.010 · Regsvr32
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri May 26windows
Detectionhightest

Regsvr32 DLL Execution With Suspicious File Extension

Detects the execution of REGSVR32.exe with DLL files masquerading as other files

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.010 · Regsvr32
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Nov 29windows
Detectionmediumtest

Scripting/CommandLine Process Spawned Regsvr32

Detects various command line and scripting engines/processes such as "PowerShell", "Wscript", "Cmd", etc. spawning a "regsvr32" instance.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.010 · Regsvr32
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri May 26windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed ZOHO Dctask64 Execution

Detects a renamed "dctask64.exe" execution, a signed binary by ZOHO Corporation part of ManageEngine Endpoint Central. This binary can be abused for DLL injection, arbitrary command and process execution.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0005 · Defense EvasionT1036 · MasqueradingT1055.001 · Dynamic-link Library Injection+2
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Jan 28windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed Mavinject.EXE Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed version of the "Mavinject" process. Which can be abused to perform process injection using the "/INJECTRUNNING" flag

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0004 · Privilege EscalationT1055.001 · Dynamic-link Library InjectionT1218.013 · Mavinject
François Hubaut+1Mon Dec 05windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed MegaSync Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed MegaSync.exe as seen used by ransomware families like Nefilim, Sodinokibi, Pysa, and Conti.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
Sittikorn STue Jun 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Visual Studio NodejsTools PressAnyKey Renamed Execution

Detects renamed execution of "Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.exe", which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute arbitrary binaries

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0002 · ExecutionTA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Apr 11windows
Detectionmediumtest

Rundll32 InstallScreenSaver Execution

An attacker may execute an application as a SCR File using rundll32.exe desk.cpl,InstallScreenSaver

WindowsProcess Creation
T1218.011 · Rundll32TA0005 · Defense Evasion
Christopher Peacock+2Thu Apr 28windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Rundll32 Setupapi.dll Activity

setupapi.dll library provide InstallHinfSection function for processing INF files. INF file may contain instructions allowing to create values in the registry, modify files and install drivers. This technique could be used to obtain persistence via modifying one of Run or RunOnce registry keys, run process or use other DLLs chain calls (see references) InstallHinfSection function in setupapi.dll calls runonce.exe executable regardless of actual content of INF file.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
Konstantin Grishchenko+1Wed Oct 07windows
Detectionhightest

Shell32 DLL Execution in Suspicious Directory

Detects shell32.dll executing a DLL in a suspicious directory

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionT1218.011 · Rundll32
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Wed Nov 24windows
Detectionhightest

RunDLL32 Spawning Explorer

Detects RunDLL32.exe spawning explorer.exe as child, which is very uncommon, often observes Gamarue spawning the explorer.exe process in an unusual way

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
elhoim+1Wed Apr 27windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Rundll32 Activity

Detects suspicious execution of rundll32, with specific calls to some DLLs with known LOLBIN functionalities

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
juju4+3Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Control Panel DLL Load

Detects suspicious Rundll32 execution from control.exe as used by Equation Group and Exploit Kits

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Apr 15windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Rundll32 Execution With Image Extension

Detects the execution of Rundll32.exe with DLL files masquerading as image files

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
Hieu TranMon Mar 13windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious ShellExec_RunDLL Call Via Ordinal

Detects suspicious call to the "ShellExec_RunDLL" exported function of SHELL32.DLL through the ordinal number to launch other commands. Adversary might only use the ordinal number in order to bypass existing detection that alert on usage of ShellExec_RunDLL on CommandLine.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
Swachchhanda Shrawan PoudelSun Dec 01windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Rundll32 Activity Invoking Sys File

Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that includes a *.sys file as seen being used by UNC2452

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Mar 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Rundll32.EXE Execution of UDL File

Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with the oledb32.dll library to open a UDL file. Threat actors can abuse this technique as a phishing vector to capture authentication credentials or other sensitive data.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionTA0011 · Command and ControlT1218.011 · Rundll32+1
kostastsaleFri Aug 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

Rundll32 Execution With Uncommon DLL Extension

Detects the execution of rundll32 with a command line that doesn't contain a common extension

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
Tim Shelton+2Thu Jan 13windows
Detectionhightest

Rundll32 UNC Path Execution

Detects rundll32 execution where the DLL is located on a remote location (share)

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionTA0008 · Lateral MovementT1021.002 · SMB/Windows Admin Shares+1
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Aug 10windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

Scheduled Task Creation with Curl and PowerShell Execution Combo

Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe, potentially in combination with curl for downloading payloads and PowerShell for executing them. This facilitates executing malicious payloads or connecting with C&C server persistently without dropping the malware sample on the host.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0004 · Privilege EscalationTA0002 · ExecutionTA0003 · PersistenceT1053.005 · Scheduled Task+4
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Wed Feb 05windows
Detectionhightest

Sdiagnhost Calling Suspicious Child Process

Detects sdiagnhost.exe calling a suspicious child process (e.g. used in exploits for Follina / CVE-2022-30190)

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1036 · MasqueradingT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
kostastsaleWed Jun 01windows
Detectionhightest

Uncommon Child Process Of Setres.EXE

Detects uncommon child process of Setres.EXE. Setres.EXE is a Windows server only process and tool that can be used to set the screen resolution. It can potentially be abused in order to launch any arbitrary file with a name containing the word "choice" from the current execution path.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218 · System Binary Proxy ExecutionT1202 · Indirect Command Execution
@gott_cyber+1Sun Dec 11windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Suspicious Speech Runtime Binary Child Process

Detects suspicious Speech Runtime Binary Execution by monitoring its child processes. Child processes spawned by SpeechRuntime.exe could indicate an attempt for lateral movement via COM & DCOM hijacking.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0008 · Lateral MovementT1021.003 · Distributed Component Object ModelT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
andrewdanisThu Oct 23windows
Detectionmediumtest

Arbitrary File Download Via Squirrel.EXE

Detects the usage of the "Squirrel.exe" to download arbitrary files. This binary is part of multiple Electron based software installations (Slack, Teams, Discord, etc.)

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+3Thu Jun 09windows
Detectionmediumtest

Process Proxy Execution Via Squirrel.EXE

Detects the usage of the "Squirrel.exe" binary to execute arbitrary processes. This binary is part of multiple Electron based software installations (Slack, Teams, Discord, etc.)

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+3Thu Jun 09windows
Detectionmediumtest

Program Executed Using Proxy/Local Command Via SSH.EXE

Detect usage of the "ssh.exe" binary as a proxy to launch other programs.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
François Hubaut+1Thu Dec 29windows
Detectionhightest

Execution via stordiag.exe

Detects the use of stordiag.exe to execute schtasks.exe systeminfo.exe and fltmc.exe

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
Austin SongerThu Oct 21windows
Detectionhightest

Bad Opsec Defaults Sacrificial Processes With Improper Arguments

Detects attackers using tooling with bad opsec defaults. E.g. spawning a sacrificial process to inject a capability into the process without taking into account how the process is normally run. One trivial example of this is using rundll32.exe without arguments as a sacrificial process (default in CS, now highlighted by c2lint), running WerFault without arguments (Kraken - credit am0nsec), and other examples.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
Oleg Kolesnikov invrep_de+3Fri Oct 23windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential File Download Via MS-AppInstaller Protocol Handler

Detects usage of the "ms-appinstaller" protocol handler via command line to potentially download arbitrary files via AppInstaller.EXE The downloaded files are temporarly stored in ":\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.DesktopAppInstaller_8wekyb3d8bbwe\AC\INetCache\<RANDOM-8-CHAR-DIRECTORY>"

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionTA0002 · ExecutionT1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Thu Nov 09windows
Detectionhightest

Potential PowerShell Execution Via DLL

Detects potential PowerShell execution from a DLL instead of the usual PowerShell process as seen used in PowerShdll. This detection assumes that PowerShell commands are passed via the CommandLine.

WindowsProcess Creation
TA0005 · Defense EvasionT1218.011 · Rundll32
Markus Neis+1Sat Aug 25windows