Rule Library

Sigma Rules

219 rules found for "attack.T1059.001"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Emerging Threathightest

Potential Bumblebee Remote Thread Creation

Detects remote thread injection events based on action seen used by bumblebee

WindowsRemote Thread Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Sep 272022
Emerging Threathightest

ChromeLoader Malware Execution

Detects execution of ChromeLoader malware via a registered scheduled task

WindowsProcess Creation
kostastsaleMon Jan 102022
Emerging Threathightest

Raspberry Robin Subsequent Execution of Commands

Detects raspberry robin subsequent execution of commands.

WindowsProcess Creation
kostastsaleFri May 062022
Emerging Threathightest

Raspberry Robin Initial Execution From External Drive

Detects the initial execution of the Raspberry Robin malware from an external drive using "Cmd.EXE".

WindowsProcess Creation
kostastsaleFri May 062022
Emerging Threathightest

FakeUpdates/SocGholish Activity

Detects initial execution of FakeUpdates/SocGholish malware via wscript that later executes commands via cmd or powershell.

WindowsProcess Creation
kostastsaleThu Jun 162022
Emerging Threathightest

MERCURY APT Activity

Detects suspicious command line patterns seen being used by MERCURY APT

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 262022
Emerging Threatcriticaltest

Rorschach Ransomware Execution Activity

Detects Rorschach ransomware execution activity

WindowsProcess Creation
X__Junior (Nextron Systems)Tue Apr 042023
Emerging Threathightest

Potential APT FIN7 POWERHOLD Execution

Detects execution of the POWERHOLD script seen used by FIN7 as reported by WithSecureLabs

WindowsPowerShell Script
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu May 042023
Emerging Threathightest

Potential POWERTRASH Script Execution

Detects potential execution of the PowerShell script POWERTRASH

WindowsPowerShell Script
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu May 042023
Emerging Threathightest

Lace Tempest PowerShell Evidence Eraser

Detects a PowerShell script used by Lace Tempest APT to erase evidence from victim servers by exploiting CVE-2023-47246 as reported by SysAid Team

WindowsPowerShell Script
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Nov 092023
Emerging Threathightest

Lace Tempest PowerShell Launcher

Detects a PowerShell script used by Lace Tempest APT to launch their malware loader by exploiting CVE-2023-47246 as reported by SysAid Team

WindowsPowerShell Script
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Nov 092023
Emerging Threatmediumtest

Potential APT FIN7 Exploitation Activity

Detects potential APT FIN7 exploitation activity as reported by Google. In order to obtain initial access, FIN7 used compromised Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials to login to a target server and initiate specific Windows process chains.

WindowsProcess Creation
Alex WalstonMon Jul 292024
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Potential Exploitation of GoAnywhere MFT Vulnerability

Detects suspicious command execution by child processes of the GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer (MFT) application, which may indicate exploitation such as CVE-2025-10035. This behavior is indicative of post-exploitation activity related to CVE-2025-10035, as observed in campaigns by the threat actor Storm-1175.

WindowsProcess Creation
MSFT+1Tue Oct 072025
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

Suspicious CrushFTP Child Process

Detects suspicious child processes spawned by the CrushFTP service that may indicate exploitation of remote code execution vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-31161, where attackers can achieve RCE through crafted HTTP requests. The detection focuses on commonly abused Windows executables (like powershell.exe, cmd.exe etc.) that attackers typically use post-exploitation to execute malicious commands.

WindowsProcess Creation
Craig Sweeney+6Thu Apr 102025
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Potential Exploitation of CrushFTP RCE Vulnerability (CVE-2025-54309)

Detects suspicious child processes created by CrushFTP. It could be an indication of exploitation of a RCE vulnerability such as CVE-2025-54309.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nisarg SutharFri Aug 012025
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Kalambur Backdoor Curl TOR SOCKS Proxy Execution

Detects the execution of the "curl.exe" command, referencing "SOCKS" and ".onion" domains, which could be indicative of Kalambur backdoor activity.

WindowsProcess Creation
Arda Buyukkaya (EclecticIQ)Tue Feb 112025
Threat Huntmediumtest

Remote Thread Creation Via PowerShell

Detects the creation of a remote thread from a Powershell process to another process

WindowsRemote Thread Creation
Nikita Nazarov+1Tue Oct 06windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Network Connection Initiated By PowerShell Process

Detects a network connection that was initiated from a PowerShell process. Often times malicious powershell scripts download additional payloads or communicate back to command and control channels via uncommon ports or IPs. Use this rule as a basis for hunting for anomalies.

WindowsNetwork Connection
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Mar 13windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Uncommon PowerShell Hosts

Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe

WindowsPowerShell Classic
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)Sun Aug 11windows
Threat Huntlowtest

bXOR Operator Usage In PowerShell Command Line - PowerShell Classic

Detects powershell execution with that make use of to the bxor (Bitwise XOR). Attackers might use as an alternative obfuscation method to Base64 encoded commands. Investigate the CommandLine and process tree to determine if the activity is malicious.

WindowsPowerShell Classic
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+1Mon Jun 29windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

WinAPI Library Calls Via PowerShell Scripts

Detects calls to WinAPI libraries from PowerShell scripts. Attackers can often leverage these APIs to avoid detection based on typical PowerShell function calls. Use this rule as a basis to hunt for interesting scripts.

WindowsPowerShell Script
Nikita Nazarov+2Fri Jul 21windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

WinAPI Function Calls Via PowerShell Scripts

Detects calls to WinAPI functions from PowerShell scripts. Attackers can often leverage these APIs to avoid detection based on typical PowerShell function calls. Use this rule as a basis to hunt for interesting scripts.

WindowsPowerShell Script
Nikita Nazarov+2Fri Jul 21windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Headless Process Launched Via Conhost.EXE

Detects the launch of a child process via "conhost.exe" with the "--headless" flag. The "--headless" flag hides the windows from the user upon execution.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Jul 23windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Unusually Long PowerShell CommandLine

Detects unusually long PowerShell command lines with a length of 1000 characters or more

WindowsProcess Creation
oscd.community+1Tue Oct 06windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Invocation Of Crypto-Classes From The "Cryptography" PowerShell Namespace

Detects the invocation of PowerShell commands with references to classes from the "System.Security.Cryptography" namespace. The PowerShell namespace "System.Security.Cryptography" provides classes for on-the-fly encryption and decryption. These can be used for example in decrypting malicious payload for defense evasion.

WindowsProcess Creation
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)Fri Dec 01windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes

Detects potentially suspicious child processes spawned by PowerShell. Use this rule to hunt for potential anomalies initiating from PowerShell scripts and commands.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Apr 26windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Registry Set With Crypto-Classes From The "Cryptography" PowerShell Namespace

Detects the setting of a registry inside the "\Shell\Open\Command" value with PowerShell classes from the "System.Security.Cryptography" namespace. The PowerShell namespace "System.Security.Cryptography" provides classes for on-the-fly encryption and decryption. These can be used for example in decrypting malicious payload for defense evasion.

WindowsRegistry Set
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)Fri Dec 01windows