Rule Library

Sigma Rules

352 rules found for "oscd.community"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Recon Activity Via Nltest.EXE

Detects nltest commands that can be used for information discovery

WindowsProcess Creation
Craig Young+2Sat Jul 24windows
Detectionmediumtest

New DLL Registered Via Odbcconf.EXE

Detects execution of "odbcconf" with "REGSVR" in order to register a new DLL (equivalent to running regsvr32). Attackers abuse this to install and run malicious DLLs.

WindowsProcess Creation
Kirill Kiryanov+4Mon May 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Response File Execution Via Odbcconf.EXE

Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "-f" flag in order to load a response file which might contain a malicious action.

WindowsProcess Creation
Kirill Kiryanov+4Mon May 22windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Arbitrary File Download Using Office Application

Detects potential arbitrary file download using a Microsoft Office application

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+2Tue May 17windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Arbitrary DLL Load Using Winword

Detects potential DLL sideloading using the Microsoft Office winword process via the '/l' flag.

WindowsProcess Creation
Victor Sergeev+1Fri Oct 09windows
Detectionmediumtest

Audio Capture via PowerShell

Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet.

WindowsProcess Creation
E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections+3Thu Oct 24windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Encoded PowerShell Command Line

Detects suspicious powershell process starts with base64 encoded commands (e.g. Emotet)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+5Mon Sep 03windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Process Execution Proxy Via CL_Invocation.ps1

Detects calls to "SyncInvoke" that is part of the "CL_Invocation.ps1" script to proxy execution using "System.Diagnostics.Process"

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+2Wed Oct 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Script Proxy Execution Via CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1

Detects the use of the Microsoft signed script "CL_mutexverifiers" to proxy the execution of additional PowerShell script commands

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+3Sat May 21windows
Detectionmediumtest

ConvertTo-SecureString Cmdlet Usage Via CommandLine

Detects usage of the "ConvertTo-SecureString" cmdlet via the commandline. Which is fairly uncommon and could indicate potential suspicious activity

WindowsProcess Creation
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+3Sun Oct 11windows
Detectionhightest

Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands

Detects the presence of reversed PowerShell commands in the CommandLine. This is often used as a method of obfuscation by attackers

WindowsProcess Creation
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+3Sun Oct 11windows
Detectionhightest

Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation

Detects the PowerShell command lines with special characters

WindowsProcess Creation
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+3Thu Oct 15windows
Detectionlowtest

New Service Creation Using PowerShell

Detects the creation of a new service using powershell.

WindowsProcess Creation
Timur Zinniatullin+2Mon Feb 20windows
Detectionhightest

Disable Windows Defender AV Security Monitoring

Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell

WindowsProcess Creation
ok invrep-de+2Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionmediumtest

PowerShell Download Pattern

Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+2Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionlowtest

Potential Encoded PowerShell Patterns In CommandLine

Detects specific combinations of encoding methods in PowerShell via the commandline

WindowsProcess Creation
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+3Sun Oct 11windows
Detectionlowtest

Non Interactive PowerShell Process Spawned

Detects non-interactive PowerShell activity by looking at the "powershell" process with a non-user GUI process such as "explorer.exe" as a parent.

WindowsProcess Creation
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Thu Sep 12windows
Detectionhightest

Run PowerShell Script from ADS

Detects PowerShell script execution from Alternate Data Stream (ADS)

WindowsProcess Creation
Sergey Soldatov+2Wed Oct 30windows
Detectionhightest

Run PowerShell Script from Redirected Input Stream

Detects PowerShell script execution via input stream redirect

WindowsProcess Creation
Moriarty Meng+2Sat Oct 17windows
Detectionlowtest

Stop Windows Service Via PowerShell Stop-Service

Detects the stopping of a Windows service via the PowerShell Cmdlet "Stop-Service"

WindowsProcess Creation
Jakob Weinzettl+2Sun Mar 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

PowerShell Script Run in AppData

Detects a suspicious command line execution that invokes PowerShell with reference to an AppData folder

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+2Wed Jan 09windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious XOR Encoded PowerShell Command

Detects presence of a potentially xor encoded powershell command

WindowsProcess Creation
Sami Ruohonen+6Wed Sep 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Screen Capture Activity Via Psr.EXE

Detects execution of Windows Problem Steps Recorder (psr.exe), a utility used to record the user screen and clicks.

WindowsProcess Creation
Beyu Denis+1Sat Oct 12windows
Detectionhightest

PUA - AdFind Suspicious Execution

Detects AdFind execution with common flags seen used during attacks

WindowsProcess Creation
Janantha Marasinghe+3Tue Feb 02windows
Detectionlowtest

Files Added To An Archive Using Rar.EXE

Detects usage of "rar" to add files to an archive for potential compression. An adversary may compress data (e.g. sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.

WindowsProcess Creation
Timur Zinniatullin+2Mon Oct 21windows
Detectionhightest

Exports Critical Registry Keys To a File

Detects the export of a crital Registry key to a file.

WindowsProcess Creation
Oddvar Moe+2Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionlowtest

Exports Registry Key To a File

Detects the export of the target Registry key to a file.

WindowsProcess Creation
Oddvar Moe+2Wed Oct 07windows
Detectionmediumtest

Imports Registry Key From a File

Detects the import of the specified file to the registry with regedit.exe.

WindowsProcess Creation
Oddvar Moe+2Wed Oct 07windows
Detectionhightest

Imports Registry Key From an ADS

Detects the import of a alternate datastream to the registry with regedit.exe.

WindowsProcess Creation
Oddvar Moe+2Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Registry Modification From ADS Via Regini.EXE

Detects the import of an alternate data stream with regini.exe, regini.exe can be used to modify registry keys.

WindowsProcess Creation
Eli Salem+2Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionlowtest

Registry Modification Via Regini.EXE

Detects the execution of regini.exe which can be used to modify registry keys, the changes are imported from one or more text files.

WindowsProcess Creation
Eli Salem+2Thu Oct 08windows
Detectionmediumtest

DLL Execution Via Register-cimprovider.exe

Detects using register-cimprovider.exe to execute arbitrary dll file.

WindowsProcess Creation
Ivan Dyachkov+2Wed Oct 07windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Debugger Registration Cmdline

Detects the registration of a debugger for a program that is available in the logon screen (sticky key backdoor).

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+2Fri Sep 06windows
Detectionmediumtest

Direct Autorun Keys Modification

Detects direct modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry using reg.exe.

WindowsProcess Creation
Victor Sergeev+3Fri Oct 25windows
Detectionhightest

Dumping of Sensitive Hives Via Reg.EXE

Detects the usage of "reg.exe" in order to dump sensitive registry hives. This includes SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives.

WindowsProcess Creation
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+5Tue Oct 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Configuration And Service Reconnaissance Via Reg.EXE

Detects the usage of "reg.exe" in order to query reconnaissance information from the registry. Adversaries may interact with the Windows registry to gather information about credentials, the system, configuration, and installed software.

WindowsProcess Creation
Timur Zinniatullin+1Mon Oct 21windows
Detectionmediumtest

Detected Windows Software Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nikita Nazarov+1Fri Oct 16windows
Detectionlowtest

Discovery of a System Time

Identifies use of various commands to query a systems time. This technique may be used before executing a scheduled task or to discover the time zone of a target system.

WindowsProcess Creation
E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections+2Thu Oct 24windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename

Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName datapoint.

WindowsProcess Creation
Matthew Green+4Sat Jun 15windows
Detectionmediumtest

Renamed FTP.EXE Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed "ftp.exe" binary based on the PE metadata fields

WindowsProcess Creation
Victor Sergeev+1Fri Oct 09windows
Detectionmediumtest

Capture Credentials with Rpcping.exe

Detects using Rpcping.exe to send a RPC test connection to the target server (-s) and force the NTLM hash to be sent in the process.

WindowsProcess Creation
Julia Fomina+1Fri Oct 09windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Process Start Locations

Detects suspicious process run from unusual locations

WindowsProcess Creation
juju4+2Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Rundll32 Setupapi.dll Activity

setupapi.dll library provide InstallHinfSection function for processing INF files. INF file may contain instructions allowing to create values in the registry, modify files and install drivers. This technique could be used to obtain persistence via modifying one of Run or RunOnce registry keys, run process or use other DLLs chain calls (see references) InstallHinfSection function in setupapi.dll calls runonce.exe executable regardless of actual content of INF file.

WindowsProcess Creation
Konstantin Grishchenko+1Wed Oct 07windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Rundll32 Activity

Detects suspicious execution of rundll32, with specific calls to some DLLs with known LOLBIN functionalities

WindowsProcess Creation
juju4+3Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionlowtest

Run Once Task Execution as Configured in Registry

This rule detects the execution of Run Once task as configured in the registry

WindowsProcess Creation
Avneet Singh+2Sun Oct 18windows
Detectionlowtest

New Service Creation Using Sc.EXE

Detects the creation of a new service using the "sc.exe" utility.

WindowsProcess Creation
Timur Zinniatullin+2Mon Feb 20windows
Detectionhightest

Deny Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE

Detects suspicious DACL modifications to deny access to a service that affects critical trustees. This can be used to hide services or make them unstoppable.

WindowsProcess Creation
Jonhnathan Ribeiro+1Fri Oct 16windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Service Path Modification

Detects service path modification via the "sc" binary to a suspicious command or path

WindowsProcess Creation
Victor Sergeev+2Mon Oct 21windows