Rule Library

Sigma Rules

416 rules found for "attack.T1059"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

Potential SAP NetWeaver Webshell Creation - Linux

Detects the creation of suspicious files (jsp, java, class) in SAP NetWeaver directories, which may indicate exploitation attempts of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-31324.

LinuxFile Event
Elastic Security+1Mon Apr 282025
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

Potential SAP NetWeaver Webshell Creation

Detects the creation of suspicious files (jsp, java, class) in SAP NetWeaver directories, which may indicate exploitation attempts of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-31324.

WindowsFile Event
Elastic Security+1Mon Apr 282025
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

Suspicious Child Process of SAP NetWeaver - Linux

Detects suspicious child processes spawned by SAP NetWeaver on Linux systems that could indicate potential exploitation of vulnerability that allows arbitrary execution via webshells such as CVE-2025-31324.

LinuxProcess Creation
Elastic Security+1Mon Apr 282025
Emerging Threatmediumexperimental

Suspicious Child Process of SAP NetWeaver

Detects suspicious child processes spawned by SAP NetWeaver that could indicate potential exploitation of vulnerability that allows arbitrary execution via webshells such as CVE-2025-31324.

WindowsProcess Creation
Elastic Security+1Mon Apr 282025
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Potential Exploitation of CrushFTP RCE Vulnerability (CVE-2025-54309)

Detects suspicious child processes created by CrushFTP. It could be an indication of exploitation of a RCE vulnerability such as CVE-2025-54309.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nisarg SutharFri Aug 012025
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Linux Suspicious Child Process from Node.js - React2Shell

Detects suspicious child processes spawned from Node.js server processes on Linux systems, potentially indicating remote code execution exploitation such as CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell). This rule particularly looks for exploitation of vulnerability on Node.js Servers where attackers abuse Node.js child_process module to execute arbitrary system commands. When execSync() or exec() is used, the command line often includes a shell invocation followed by suspicious commands or scripts (e.g., /bin/sh -c <malicious-command>). For other methods, the Image field will show the spawned process directly.

LinuxProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Dec 052025
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Windows Suspicious Child Process from Node.js - React2Shell

Detects suspicious child processes started by Node.js server processes on Windows, which may indicate exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell). Attackers can abuse the Node.js 'child_process' module to run system commands or scripts using methods such as spawn(), exec(), execFile(), fork(), or execSync(). If execSync() or exec() is used in the exploit, the command line often shows a shell (e.g., cmd.exe /d /s /c ...) running a suspicious command unless other shells are explicitly invoked. For other methods, the spawned process appears directly in the Image field unless a shell is explicitly used.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Dec 052025
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Atomic MacOS Stealer - FileGrabber Activity

Detects suspicious activity associated with Atomic MacOS Stealer (Amos) campaigns, including execution of FileGrabber and curl-based POST requests used for data exfiltration. The rule identifies either the execution of FileGrabber targeting /tmp or the use of curl to POST sensitive user data (including files such as /tmp/out.zip) to remote servers, which are key indicators of Amos infostealer activity.

macOSProcess Creation
Jason Phang Vern - Onn+1Sat Nov 222025
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Kalambur Backdoor Curl TOR SOCKS Proxy Execution

Detects the execution of the "curl.exe" command, referencing "SOCKS" and ".onion" domains, which could be indicative of Kalambur backdoor activity.

WindowsProcess Creation
Arda Buyukkaya (EclecticIQ)Tue Feb 112025
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Shai-Hulud Malware Indicators - Linux

Detects potential Shai-Hulud malware indicators based on specific command line arguments associated with its execution.

LinuxProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Tue Nov 252025
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Shai-Hulud Malware Indicators - Windows

Detects potential Shai-Hulud malware indicators based on specific command line arguments associated with its execution.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Tue Nov 252025
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Axios NPM Compromise Indicators - Linux

Detects the Linux-specific execution chain of the plain-crypto-js malicious npm dependency by Axios NPM package, including payload download via curl and detached execution using nohup and python3. On March 30, 2026, malicious versions (1.14.1, 0.30.4) were published to npm, injecting a dependency (plain-crypto-js@4.2.1) that executed a postinstall script as a cross-platform RAT dropper. The dropper contacted a C2 server, delivered platform-specific payloads, deleted itself, and replaced package.json to evade detection.

LinuxProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Wed Apr 012026
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Axios NPM Compromise Indicators - macOS

Detects the macOS-specific execution chain of the plain-crypto-js malicious npm dependency in Axios NPM Package, including AppleScript execution via osascript, payload download, permission modification, execution, and cleanup.

macOSProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Wed Apr 012026
Emerging Threathighexperimental

Axios NPM Compromise Indicators - Windows

Detects the specific Windows execution chain and process tree associated with the Axios NPM supply chain compromise. On March 30, 2026, malicious versions (1.14.1, 0.30.4) were published to npm, injecting a dependency (plain-crypto-js@4.2.1) that executed a postinstall script as a cross-platform RAT dropper. The dropper contacted a C2 server, delivered platform-specific payloads, deleted itself, and replaced package.json to evade detection. The attack used cscript.exe (VBScript), curl.exe (C2), and PowerShell masquerading as Windows Terminal.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Wed Apr 012026
Threat Huntmediumtest

Python Path Configuration File Creation - Linux

Detects creation of a Python path configuration file (.pth) in Python library folders, which can be maliciously abused for code execution and persistence. Modules referenced by these files are run at every Python startup (v3.5+), regardless of whether the module is imported by the calling script. Default paths are '\lib\site-packages\*.pth' (Windows) and '/lib/pythonX.Y/site-packages/*.pth' (Unix and macOS).

LinuxFile Event
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)Thu Apr 25linux
Threat Huntlowexperimental

Potentially Suspicious Long Filename Pattern - Linux

Detects the creation of files with unusually long filenames (100 or more characters), which may indicate obfuscation techniques used by malware such as VShell. This is a hunting rule to identify potential threats that use long filenames to evade detection. Keep in mind that on a legitimate system, such long filenames can and are common. Run this detection in the context of threat hunting rather than alerting. Adjust the threshold of filename length as needed based on your environment.

LinuxFile Event
kostastsaleSat Nov 22linux
Threat Huntmediumtest

Python Path Configuration File Creation - MacOS

Detects creation of a Python path configuration file (.pth) in Python library folders, which can be maliciously abused for code execution and persistence. Modules referenced by these files are run at every Python startup (v3.5+), regardless of whether the module is imported by the calling script. Default paths are '\lib\site-packages\*.pth' (Windows) and '/lib/pythonX.Y/site-packages/*.pth' (Unix and macOS).

macOSFile Event
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)Thu Apr 25macos
Threat Huntmediumtest

Remote Thread Creation Via PowerShell

Detects the creation of a remote thread from a Powershell process to another process

WindowsRemote Thread Creation
Nikita Nazarov+1Tue Oct 06windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Python Path Configuration File Creation - Windows

Detects creation of a Python path configuration file (.pth) in Python library folders, which can be maliciously abused for code execution and persistence. Modules referenced by these files are run at every Python startup (v3.5+), regardless of whether the module is imported by the calling script. Default paths are '\lib\site-packages\*.pth' (Windows) and '/lib/pythonX.Y/site-packages/*.pth' (Unix and macOS).

WindowsFile Event
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)+1Thu Apr 25windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Network Connection Initiated By PowerShell Process

Detects a network connection that was initiated from a PowerShell process. Often times malicious powershell scripts download additional payloads or communicate back to command and control channels via uncommon ports or IPs. Use this rule as a basis for hunting for anomalies.

WindowsNetwork Connection
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Mar 13windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Uncommon PowerShell Hosts

Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe

WindowsPowerShell Classic
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)Sun Aug 11windows
Threat Huntlowtest

bXOR Operator Usage In PowerShell Command Line - PowerShell Classic

Detects powershell execution with that make use of to the bxor (Bitwise XOR). Attackers might use as an alternative obfuscation method to Base64 encoded commands. Investigate the CommandLine and process tree to determine if the activity is malicious.

WindowsPowerShell Classic
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+1Mon Jun 29windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

WinAPI Library Calls Via PowerShell Scripts

Detects calls to WinAPI libraries from PowerShell scripts. Attackers can often leverage these APIs to avoid detection based on typical PowerShell function calls. Use this rule as a basis to hunt for interesting scripts.

WindowsPowerShell Script
Nikita Nazarov+2Fri Jul 21windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

WinAPI Function Calls Via PowerShell Scripts

Detects calls to WinAPI functions from PowerShell scripts. Attackers can often leverage these APIs to avoid detection based on typical PowerShell function calls. Use this rule as a basis to hunt for interesting scripts.

WindowsPowerShell Script
Nikita Nazarov+2Fri Jul 21windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Headless Process Launched Via Conhost.EXE

Detects the launch of a child process via "conhost.exe" with the "--headless" flag. The "--headless" flag hides the windows from the user upon execution.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Jul 23windows
Threat Huntlowtest

Unusually Long PowerShell CommandLine

Detects unusually long PowerShell command lines with a length of 1000 characters or more

WindowsProcess Creation
oscd.community+1Tue Oct 06windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Invocation Of Crypto-Classes From The "Cryptography" PowerShell Namespace

Detects the invocation of PowerShell commands with references to classes from the "System.Security.Cryptography" namespace. The PowerShell namespace "System.Security.Cryptography" provides classes for on-the-fly encryption and decryption. These can be used for example in decrypting malicious payload for defense evasion.

WindowsProcess Creation
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)Fri Dec 01windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes

Detects potentially suspicious child processes spawned by PowerShell. Use this rule to hunt for potential anomalies initiating from PowerShell scripts and commands.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Apr 26windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Elevated System Shell Spawned

Detects when a shell program such as the Windows command prompt or PowerShell is launched with system privileges. Use this rule to hunt for potential suspicious processes.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Thu Nov 23windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Manual Execution of Script Inside of a Compressed File

This is a threat-hunting query to collect information related to the interactive execution of a script from inside a compressed file (zip/rar). Windows will automatically run the script using scripting interpreters such as wscript and cscript binaries. From the query below, the child process is the script interpreter that will execute the script. The script extension is also a set of standard extensions that Windows OS recognizes. Selections 1-3 contain three different execution scenarios. 1. Compressed file opened using 7zip. 2. Compressed file opened using WinRar. 3. Compressed file opened using native windows File Explorer capabilities. When the malicious script is double-clicked, it will be extracted to the respected directories as signified by the CommandLine on each of the three Selections. It will then be executed using the relevant script interpreter."

WindowsProcess Creation
kostastsaleWed Feb 15windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Detects script file execution (.js, .jse, .vba, .vbe, .vbs, .wsf, .wsh) by Wscript/Cscript.

WindowsProcess Creation
Michael HaagWed Jan 16windows
Threat Huntmediumtest

Registry Set With Crypto-Classes From The "Cryptography" PowerShell Namespace

Detects the setting of a registry inside the "\Shell\Open\Command" value with PowerShell classes from the "System.Security.Cryptography" namespace. The PowerShell namespace "System.Security.Cryptography" provides classes for on-the-fly encryption and decryption. These can be used for example in decrypting malicious payload for defense evasion.

WindowsRegistry Set
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)Fri Dec 01windows