Rule Library

Sigma Rules

46 rules found for "Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionhightest

Code Injection by ld.so Preload

Detects the ld.so preload persistence file. See `man ld.so` for more information.

Linux
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Wed May 05linux
Detectioncriticaltest

Mailbox Export to Exchange Webserver

Detects a successful export of an Exchange mailbox to untypical directory or with aspx name suffix which can be used to place a webshell or the needed role assignment for it

Windowsmsexchange-management
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+2Mon Aug 09windows
Detectionhightest

Remove Exported Mailbox from Exchange Webserver

Detects removal of an exported Exchange mailbox which could be to cover tracks from ProxyShell exploit

Windowsmsexchange-management
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 27windows
Detectionhightest

Hidden Local User Creation

Detects the creation of a local hidden user account which should not happen for event ID 4720.

Windowssecurity
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon May 03windows
Detectionmediumstable

Windows Defender Exclusions Added

Detects the Setting of Windows Defender Exclusions

Windowswindefend
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Tue Jul 06windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using Consent and Comctl32 - File

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll (UACMe 22)

WindowsFile Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using .NET Code Profiler on MMC

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using .NET Code Profiler and mmc.exe DLL hijacking (UACMe 39)

WindowsFile Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using IEInstal - File

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using IEInstal.exe (UACMe 64)

WindowsFile Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using MSConfig Token Modification - File

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a msconfig GUI hack (UACMe 55)

WindowsFile Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using NTFS Reparse Point - File

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using NTFS reparse point and wusa.exe DLL hijacking (UACMe 36)

WindowsFile Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Abusing Winsat Path Parsing - File

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a path parsing issue in winsat.exe (UACMe 52)

WindowsFile Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - File

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32)

WindowsFile Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

CobaltStrike Named Pipe Patterns

Detects the creation of a named pipe with a pattern found in CobaltStrike malleable C2 profiles

WindowsNamed Pipe Created
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Jul 30windows
Detectionhightest

HackTool - Rubeus Execution - ScriptBlock

Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus using specific command line flags

WindowsPowerShell Script
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)+1Thu Apr 27windows
Detectionhightest

HackTool - CobaltStrike BOF Injection Pattern

Detects a typical pattern of a CobaltStrike BOF which inject into other processes

WindowsProcess Access
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Wed Aug 04windows
Detectionhightest

HackTool - LittleCorporal Generated Maldoc Injection

Detects the process injection of a LittleCorporal generated Maldoc.

WindowsProcess Access
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 09windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Direct Syscall of NtOpenProcess

Detects potential calls to NtOpenProcess directly from NTDLL.

WindowsProcess Access
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)+1Wed Jul 28windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using WOW64 Logger DLL Hijack

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a WoW64 logger DLL hijack (UACMe 30)

WindowsProcess Access
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Suspicious CertReq Command to Download

Detects a suspicious CertReq execution downloading a file. This behavior is often used by attackers to download additional payloads or configuration files. Certreq is a built-in Windows utility used to request and retrieve certificates from a certification authority (CA). However, it can be abused by threat actors for malicious purposes.

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Wed Nov 24windows
Detectionhightest

HackTool - UACMe Akagi Execution

Detects the execution of UACMe, a tool used for UAC bypasses, via default PE metadata

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

PowerShell Base64 Encoded Reflective Assembly Load

Detects base64 encoded .NET reflective loading of Assembly

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Mar 01windows
Detectionhightest

PowerShell Base64 Encoded WMI Classes

Detects calls to base64 encoded WMI class such as "Win32_ShadowCopy", "Win32_ScheduledJob", etc.

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Jan 30windows
Detectionhightest

Shell32 DLL Execution in Suspicious Directory

Detects shell32.dll executing a DLL in a suspicious directory

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Wed Nov 24windows
Detectionhightest

Bad Opsec Defaults Sacrificial Processes With Improper Arguments

Detects attackers using tooling with bad opsec defaults. E.g. spawning a sacrificial process to inject a capability into the process without taking into account how the process is normally run. One trivial example of this is using rundll32.exe without arguments as a sacrificial process (default in CS, now highlighted by c2lint), running WerFault without arguments (Kraken - credit am0nsec), and other examples.

WindowsProcess Creation
Oleg Kolesnikov invrep_de+3Fri Oct 23windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Command Line Path Traversal Evasion Attempt

Detects potential evasion or obfuscation attempts using bogus path traversal via the commandline

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Tue Oct 26windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using ChangePK and SLUI

Detects an UAC bypass that uses changepk.exe and slui.exe (UACMe 61)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using Disk Cleanup

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using scheduled tasks and variable expansion of cleanmgr.exe (UACMe 34)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhighstable

CMSTP UAC Bypass via COM Object Access

Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects (e.g. UACMe ID of 41, 43, 58 or 65)

WindowsProcess Creation
Nik Seetharaman+1Wed Jul 31windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Tools Using ComputerDefaults

Detects tools such as UACMe used to bypass UAC with computerdefaults.exe (UACMe 59)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Tue Aug 31windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using Consent and Comctl32 - Process

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll (UACMe 22)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using DismHost

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using DismHost DLL hijacking (UACMe 63)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using IEInstal - Process

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using IEInstal.exe (UACMe 64)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using MSConfig Token Modification - Process

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a msconfig GUI hack (UACMe 55)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using NTFS Reparse Point - Process

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using NTFS reparse point and wusa.exe DLL hijacking (UACMe 36)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using PkgMgr and DISM

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using pkgmgr.exe and dism.exe (UACMe 23)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Abusing Winsat Path Parsing - Process

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a path parsing issue in winsat.exe (UACMe 52)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - Process

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass WSReset

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass via WSReset usable by default sysmon-config

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

Xwizard.EXE Execution From Non-Default Location

Detects the execution of Xwizard tool from a non-default directory. When executed from a non-default directory, this utility can be abused in order to side load a custom version of "xwizards.dll".

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Sep 20windows
Detectionhightest

Terminal Server Client Connection History Cleared - Registry

Detects the deletion of registry keys containing the MSTSC connection history

WindowsRegistry Delete
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Tue Oct 19windows
Detectionhightest

Creation of a Local Hidden User Account by Registry

Sysmon registry detection of a local hidden user account.

WindowsRegistry Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon May 03windows
Detectionhightest

Shell Open Registry Keys Manipulation

Detects the shell open key manipulation (exefile and ms-settings) used for persistence and the pattern of UAC Bypass using fodhelper.exe, computerdefaults.exe, slui.exe via registry keys (e.g. UACMe 33 or 62)

WindowsRegistry Event
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionmediumtest

Windows Defender Exclusions Added - Registry

Detects the Setting of Windows Defender Exclusions

WindowsRegistry Set
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Tue Jul 06windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass via Sdclt

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using registry key manipulation of sdclt.exe (e.g. UACMe 53)

WindowsRegistry Set
Omer Yampel+1Fri Mar 17windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Abusing Winsat Path Parsing - Registry

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a path parsing issue in winsat.exe (UACMe 52)

WindowsRegistry Set
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - Registry

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32)

WindowsRegistry Set
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows