Rule Library

Sigma Rules

51 rules found for "attack.T1047"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionhightest

Remote DCOM/WMI Lateral Movement

Detects remote RPC calls that performs remote DCOM operations. These could be abused for lateral movement via DCOM or WMI.

rpc_firewallapplication
Sagie Dulce+1Sat Jan 01application
Detectionmediumtest

MITRE BZAR Indicators for Execution

Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate an execution techniques on the remote system. All credit for the Zeek mapping of the suspicious endpoint/operation field goes to MITRE

Zeek (Bro)dce_rpc
@neu5ron+1Thu Mar 19network
Detectionlowstable

Successful Account Login Via WMI

Detects successful logon attempts performed with WMI

Windowssecurity
Thomas PatzkeWed Dec 04windows
Detectionhightest

T1047 Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack

Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.

Windowssecurity
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionhightest

PSExec and WMI Process Creations Block

Detects blocking of process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands

Windowswindefend
Bhabesh RajTue Jul 14windows
Detectioncriticaltest

Wmiexec Default Output File

Detects the creation of the default output filename used by the wmiexec tool

WindowsFile Event
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jun 02windows
Detectioncriticaltest

Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack - File

Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.

WindowsFile Event
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionhightest

Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack

Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionmediumtest

WMI Event Consumer Created Named Pipe

Detects the WMI Event Consumer service scrcons.exe creating a named pipe

WindowsNamed Pipe Created
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed Sep 01windows
Detectionhightest

WMImplant Hack Tool

Detects parameters used by WMImplant

WindowsPowerShell Script
NVISOThu Mar 26windows
Detectionmediumtest

WMIC Unquoted Services Path Lookup - PowerShell

Detects known WMI recon method to look for unquoted service paths, often used by pentest inside of powershell scripts attackers enum scripts

WindowsPowerShell Script
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jun 20windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Suspicious Autorun Registry Modified via WMI

Detects suspicious activity where the WMIC process is used to create an autorun registry entry via reg.exe, which is often indicative of persistence mechanisms employed by malware.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Mon Feb 17windows
Detectionhightest

HTML Help HH.EXE Suspicious Child Process

Detects a suspicious child process of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)

WindowsProcess Creation
Maxim Pavlunin+1Wed Apr 01windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious HH.EXE Execution

Detects a suspicious execution of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)

WindowsProcess Creation
Maxim PavluninWed Apr 01windows
Detectionhightest

HackTool - CrackMapExec Execution

This rule detect common flag combinations used by CrackMapExec in order to detect its use even if the binary has been replaced.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Feb 25windows
Detectionhighstable

HackTool - CrackMapExec Execution Patterns

Detects various execution patterns of the CrackMapExec pentesting framework

WindowsProcess Creation
Thomas PatzkeFri May 22windows
Detectionhighstable

HackTool - Potential Impacket Lateral Movement Activity

Detects wmiexec/dcomexec/atexec/smbexec from Impacket framework

WindowsProcess Creation
Ecco+3Tue Sep 03windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process

Detects a suspicious process spawning from one of the Microsoft Office suite products (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio, etc.)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+7Fri Apr 06windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

RDP Enable or Disable via Win32_TerminalServiceSetting WMI Class

Detects enabling or disabling of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) using alternate methods such as WMIC or PowerShell. In PowerShell one-liner commands, the "SetAllowTSConnections" method of the "Win32_TerminalServiceSetting" class may be used to enable or disable RDP. In WMIC, the "rdtoggle" alias or "Win32_TerminalServiceSetting" class may be used for the same purpose.

WindowsProcess Creation
Daniel Koifman (KoifSec)+1Sat Nov 15windows
Detectionhightest

Script Event Consumer Spawning Process

Detects a suspicious child process of Script Event Consumer (scrcons.exe).

WindowsProcess Creation
Sittikorn SMon Jun 21windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Windows Defender Tampering Via Wmic.EXE

Detects potential tampering with Windows Defender settings such as adding exclusion using wmic

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautSun Dec 11windows
Detectionmediumtest

New Process Created Via Wmic.EXE

Detects new process creation using WMIC via the "process call create" flag

WindowsProcess Creation
Michael Haag+3Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

Computer System Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects execution of wmic utility with the "computersystem" flag in order to obtain information about the machine such as the domain, username, model, etc.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Sep 08windows
Detectionmediumtest

Hardware Model Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of WMIC with the "csproduct" which is used to obtain information such as hardware models and vendor information

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Feb 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Windows Hotfix Updates Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of wmic with the "qfe" flag in order to obtain information about installed hotfix updates on the system. This is often used by pentester and attacker enumeration scripts

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jun 20windows
Detectionmediumtest

Process Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of "wmic" with the "process" flag, which adversary might use to list processes running on the compromised host or list installed software hotfixes and patches.

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautSat Jan 01windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Product Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of WMIC in order to get a list of firewall and antivirus products

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Feb 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Product Class Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of WMIC in order to get a list of firewall, antivirus and antispywware products. Adversaries often enumerate security products installed on a system to identify security controls and potential ways to evade detection or disable protection mechanisms. This information helps them plan their next attack steps and choose appropriate techniques to bypass security measures.

WindowsProcess Creation
Michael Haag+4Tue Feb 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Service Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

An adversary might use WMI to check if a certain remote service is running on a remote device. When the test completes, a service information will be displayed on the screen if it exists. A common feedback message is that "No instance(s) Available" if the service queried is not running. A common error message is "Node - (provided IP or default) ERROR Description =The RPC server is unavailable" if the provided remote host is unreachable

WindowsProcess Creation
François Hubaut+1Tue Feb 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Unquoted Service Path Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects known WMI recon method to look for unquoted service paths using wmic. Often used by pentester and attacker enumeration scripts

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jun 20windows
Detectionmediumtest

System Disk And Volume Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

An adversary might use WMI to discover information about the system, such as the volume name, size, free space, and other disk information. This can be done using the 'wmic' command-line utility and has been observed being used by threat actors such as Volt Typhoon.

WindowsProcess Creation
Stephen Lincoln (AttackIQ)Fri Feb 02windows
Detectionmediumtest

WMIC Remote Command Execution

Detects the execution of WMIC to query information on a remote system

WindowsProcess Creation
François Hubaut+1Tue Feb 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Service Started/Stopped Via Wmic.EXE

Detects usage of wmic to start or stop a service

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jun 20windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

Service Startup Type Change Via Wmic.EXE

Detects changes to service startup type to 'disabled' or 'manual' using the WMIC command-line utility.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Mon Apr 27windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Remote SquiblyTwo Technique Execution

Detects potential execution of the SquiblyTwo technique that leverages Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious code remotely. This technique bypasses application whitelisting by using wmic.exe to process malicious XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) scripts that can contain embedded JScript or VBScript. The attack typically works by fetching XSL content from a remote source (using HTTP/HTTPS) and executing it with full trust privileges directly in memory, avoiding disk-based detection mechanisms. This is a common LOLBin (Living Off The Land Binary) technique used for defense evasion and code execution.

WindowsProcess Creation
Markus Neis+2Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

Registry Manipulation via WMI Stdregprov

Detects the usage of wmic.exe to manipulate Windows registry via the WMI StdRegProv class. This behaviour could be potentially suspicious because it uses an alternative method to modify registry keys instead of legitimate registry tools like reg.exe or regedit.exe. Attackers specifically choose this technique to evade detection and bypass security monitoring focused on traditional registry modification commands.

WindowsProcess Creation
Daniel Koifman (KoifSec)Wed Jul 30windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious WMIC Execution Via Office Process

Office application called wmic to proxye execution through a LOLBIN process. This is often used to break suspicious parent-child chain (Office app spawns LOLBin).

WindowsProcess Creation
Vadim Khrykov+1Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE

Detects WMIC executing "process call create" with suspicious calls to processes such as "rundll32", "regsrv32", etc.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionmediumtest

Application Terminated Via Wmic.EXE

Detects calls to the "terminate" function via wmic in order to kill an application

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Sep 11windows
Detectionmediumtest

Application Removed Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the removal or uninstallation of an application via "Wmic.EXE".

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautFri Jan 28windows
Detectionmediumtest

XSL Script Execution Via WMIC.EXE

Detects the execution of WMIC with the "format" flag to potentially load local XSL files. Adversaries abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files.

WindowsProcess Creation
Timur Zinniatullin+2Mon Oct 21windows
Detectionmediumstable

WmiPrvSE Spawned A Process

Detects WmiPrvSE spawning a process

WindowsProcess Creation
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)Thu Aug 15windows
Detectionmediumstable

Potential WMI Lateral Movement WmiPrvSE Spawned PowerShell

Detects Powershell as a child of the WmiPrvSE process. Which could be a sign of lateral movement via WMI.

WindowsProcess Creation
Markus NeisWed Apr 03windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious WmiPrvSE Child Process

Detects suspicious and uncommon child processes of WmiPrvSE

WindowsProcess Creation
Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel)+2Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionmediumexperimental

Password Set to Never Expire via WMI

Detects the use of wmic.exe to modify user account settings and explicitly disable password expiration.

WindowsProcess Creation
Daniel Koifman (KoifSec)Wed Jul 30windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Encoded Scripts in a WMI Consumer

Detects suspicious encoded payloads in WMI Event Consumers

WindowsWMI Event
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed Sep 01windows
Emerging Threathightest

Blue Mockingbird

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

WindowsProcess Creation
Trent LiffickThu May 142020
Emerging Threathightest

Blue Mockingbird - Registry

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

WindowsRegistry Set
Trent LiffickThu May 142020