Rule Library

Sigma Rules

1,619 rules found

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionmediumtest

Renamed Microsoft Teams Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed Microsoft Teams binary.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Fri Jul 12windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed NetSupport RAT Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed "client32.exe" (NetSupport RAT) via Imphash, Product and OriginalFileName strings

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Sep 19windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed NirCmd.EXE Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed "NirCmd.exe" binary based on the PE metadata fields.

WindowsProcess Creation
X__Junior (Nextron Systems)Mon Mar 11windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed Office Binary Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed office binary

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Dec 20windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed PAExec Execution

Detects execution of renamed version of PAExec. Often used by attackers

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Sat May 22windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed PingCastle Binary Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed "PingCastle" binary based on the PE metadata fields.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Thu Jan 11windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed Plink Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed version of the Plink binary

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jun 06windows
Detectionmediumtest

Visual Studio NodejsTools PressAnyKey Renamed Execution

Detects renamed execution of "Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.exe", which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute arbitrary binaries

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Apr 11windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Renamed Rundll32 Execution

Detects when 'DllRegisterServer' is called in the commandline and the image is not rundll32. This could mean that the 'rundll32' utility has been renamed in order to avoid detection

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Renamed Remote Utilities RAT (RURAT) Execution

Detects execution of renamed Remote Utilities (RURAT) via Product PE header field

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Sep 19windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Renamed Schtasks Execution

Detects the execution of renamed schtasks.exe binary, which is a legitimate Windows utility used for scheduling tasks. One of the very common persistence techniques is schedule malicious tasks using schtasks.exe. Since, it is heavily abused, it is also heavily monitored by security products. To evade detection, threat actors may rename the schtasks.exe binary to schedule their malicious tasks.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Thu Nov 27windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed SysInternals DebugView Execution

Detects suspicious renamed SysInternals DebugView execution

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu May 28windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed ProcDump Execution

Detects the execution of a renamed ProcDump executable. This often done by attackers or malware in order to evade defensive mechanisms.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Nov 18windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed PsExec Service Execution

Detects suspicious launch of a renamed version of the PSEXESVC service with, which is not often used by legitimate administrators

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 21windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed Sysinternals Sdelete Execution

Detects the use of a renamed SysInternals Sdelete, which is something an administrator shouldn't do (the renaming)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Sep 06windows
Detectionhightest

Renamed Vmnat.exe Execution

Detects renamed vmnat.exe or portable version that can be used for DLL side-loading

WindowsProcess Creation
elhoimFri Sep 09windows
Detectioncriticaltest

Renamed Whoami Execution

Detects the execution of whoami that has been renamed to a different name to avoid detection

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Aug 12windows
Detectionmediumtest

Capture Credentials with Rpcping.exe

Detects using Rpcping.exe to send a RPC test connection to the target server (-s) and force the NTLM hash to be sent in the process.

WindowsProcess Creation
Julia Fomina+1Fri Oct 09windows
Detectionmediumtest

Ruby Inline Command Execution

Detects execution of ruby using the "-e" flag. This is could be used as a way to launch a reverse shell or execute live ruby code.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon Jan 02windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Rundll32 Execution With DLL Stored In ADS

Detects execution of rundll32 where the DLL being called is stored in an Alternate Data Stream (ADS).

WindowsProcess Creation
Harjot SinghSat Jan 21windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Advpack Call Via Rundll32.EXE

Detects execution of "rundll32" calling "advpack.dll" with potential obfuscated ordinal calls in order to leverage the "RegisterOCX" function

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Wed May 17windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Rundll32 Invoking Inline VBScript

Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that invokes inline VBScript as seen being used by UNC2452

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Mar 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Rundll32 InstallScreenSaver Execution

An attacker may execute an application as a SCR File using rundll32.exe desk.cpl,InstallScreenSaver

WindowsProcess Creation
Christopher Peacock+2Thu Apr 28windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Key Manager Access

Detects the invocation of the Stored User Names and Passwords dialogue (Key Manager)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Apr 21windows
Detectionhightest

Mshtml.DLL RunHTMLApplication Suspicious Usage

Detects execution of commands that leverage the "mshtml.dll" RunHTMLApplication export to run arbitrary code via different protocol handlers (vbscript, javascript, file, http...)

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+4Sun Aug 14windows
Detectionhightest

Rundll32 Execution Without CommandLine Parameters

Detects suspicious start of rundll32.exe without any parameters as found in CobaltStrike beacon activity

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu May 27windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious NTLM Authentication on the Printer Spooler Service

Detects a privilege elevation attempt by coercing NTLM authentication on the Printer Spooler service

WindowsProcess Creation
Elastic Security+1Wed May 04windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Obfuscated Ordinal Call Via Rundll32

Detects execution of "rundll32" with potential obfuscated ordinal calls

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Wed May 17windows
Detectionmediumtest

Rundll32 Spawned Via Explorer.EXE

Detects execution of "rundll32.exe" with a parent process of Explorer.exe. This has been observed by variants of Raspberry Robin, as first reported by Red Canary.

WindowsProcess Creation
CD_ROM_Sat May 21windows
Detectionhightest

Process Memory Dump Via Comsvcs.DLL

Detects a process memory dump via "comsvcs.dll" using rundll32, covering multiple different techniques (ordinal, minidump function, etc.)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+3Tue Feb 18windows
Detectionhightest

Rundll32 Registered COM Objects

load malicious registered COM objects

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautSun Feb 13windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Process Start Locations

Detects suspicious process run from unusual locations

WindowsProcess Creation
juju4+2Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Rundll32 Setupapi.dll Activity

setupapi.dll library provide InstallHinfSection function for processing INF files. INF file may contain instructions allowing to create values in the registry, modify files and install drivers. This technique could be used to obtain persistence via modifying one of Run or RunOnce registry keys, run process or use other DLLs chain calls (see references) InstallHinfSection function in setupapi.dll calls runonce.exe executable regardless of actual content of INF file.

WindowsProcess Creation
Konstantin Grishchenko+1Wed Oct 07windows
Detectionhightest

Shell32 DLL Execution in Suspicious Directory

Detects shell32.dll executing a DLL in a suspicious directory

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Wed Nov 24windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential ShellDispatch.DLL Functionality Abuse

Detects potential "ShellDispatch.dll" functionality abuse to execute arbitrary binaries via "ShellExecute"

WindowsProcess Creation
X__Junior (Nextron Systems)Tue Jun 20windows
Detectionhightest

RunDLL32 Spawning Explorer

Detects RunDLL32.exe spawning explorer.exe as child, which is very uncommon, often observes Gamarue spawning the explorer.exe process in an unusual way

WindowsProcess Creation
elhoim+1Wed Apr 27windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Rundll32 Activity

Detects suspicious execution of rundll32, with specific calls to some DLLs with known LOLBIN functionalities

WindowsProcess Creation
juju4+3Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Control Panel DLL Load

Detects suspicious Rundll32 execution from control.exe as used by Equation Group and Exploit Kits

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Apr 15windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Rundll32 Execution With Image Extension

Detects the execution of Rundll32.exe with DLL files masquerading as image files

WindowsProcess Creation
Hieu TranMon Mar 13windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Usage Of ShellExec_RunDLL

Detects suspicious usage of the ShellExec_RunDLL function to launch other commands as seen in the the raspberry-robin attack

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Sep 01windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious ShellExec_RunDLL Call Via Ordinal

Detects suspicious call to the "ShellExec_RunDLL" exported function of SHELL32.DLL through the ordinal number to launch other commands. Adversary might only use the ordinal number in order to bypass existing detection that alert on usage of ShellExec_RunDLL on CommandLine.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan PoudelSun Dec 01windows
Detectionhighstable

ShimCache Flush

Detects actions that clear the local ShimCache and remove forensic evidence

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Feb 01windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Rundll32 Activity Invoking Sys File

Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that includes a *.sys file as seen being used by UNC2452

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Mar 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Rundll32.EXE Execution of UDL File

Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with the oledb32.dll library to open a UDL file. Threat actors can abuse this technique as a phishing vector to capture authentication credentials or other sensitive data.

WindowsProcess Creation
kostastsaleFri Aug 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

Rundll32 Execution With Uncommon DLL Extension

Detects the execution of rundll32 with a command line that doesn't contain a common extension

WindowsProcess Creation
Tim Shelton+2Thu Jan 13windows
Detectionhightest

Rundll32 UNC Path Execution

Detects rundll32 execution where the DLL is located on a remote location (share)

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Aug 10windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Workstation Locking via Rundll32

Detects a suspicious call to the user32.dll function that locks the user workstation

WindowsProcess Creation
François HubautSat Jun 04windows
Detectionmediumtest

WebDav Client Execution Via Rundll32.EXE

Detects "svchost.exe" spawning "rundll32.exe" with command arguments like "C:\windows\system32\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie". This could be an indicator of exfiltration or use of WebDav to launch code (hosted on a WebDav server).

WindowsProcess Creation
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Sat May 02windows