Rule Library

Sigma Rules

498 rules found for "Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionhightest

WhoAmI as Parameter

Detects a suspicious process command line that uses whoami as first parameter (as e.g. used by EfsPotato)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Nov 29windows
Detectionhightest

Terminal Service Process Spawn

Detects a process spawned by the terminal service server process (this could be an indicator for an exploitation of CVE-2019-0708)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed May 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Uncommon Svchost Parent Process

Detects an uncommon svchost parent process

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Aug 15windows
Detectionmediumtest

Procdump Execution

Detects usage of the SysInternals Procdump utility

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 16windows
Detectionhightest

Potential SysInternals ProcDump Evasion

Detects uses of the SysInternals ProcDump utility in which ProcDump or its output get renamed, or a dump file is moved or copied to a different name

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Jan 11windows
Detectionhighstable

Potential LSASS Process Dump Via Procdump

Detects potential credential harvesting attempts through LSASS memory dumps using ProcDump. This rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns that combine memory dump flags (-ma, -mm, -mp) with LSASS-related process markers. LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) contains sensitive authentication data including plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets in memory. Attackers commonly dump LSASS memory to extract credentials for lateral movement and privilege escalation.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Oct 30windows
Detectionhightest

PsExec/PAExec Escalation to LOCAL SYSTEM

Detects suspicious commandline flags used by PsExec and PAExec to escalate a command line to LOCAL_SYSTEM rights

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Nov 23windows
Detectionhightest

Potential PsExec Remote Execution

Detects potential psexec command that initiate execution on a remote systems via common commandline flags used by the utility

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Feb 28windows
Detectionmediumtest

PsExec Service Execution

Detects launch of the PSEXESVC service, which means that this system was the target of a psexec remote execution

WindowsProcess Creation
Thomas Patzke+2Mon Jun 12windows
Detectionhightest

PsExec Service Child Process Execution as LOCAL SYSTEM

Detects suspicious launch of the PSEXESVC service on this system and a sub process run as LOCAL_SYSTEM (-s), which means that someone remotely started a command on this system running it with highest privileges and not only the privileges of the login user account (e.g. the administrator account)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 21windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Privilege Escalation To LOCAL SYSTEM

Detects unknown program using commandline flags usually used by tools such as PsExec and PAExec to start programs with SYSTEM Privileges

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Sat May 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Sysprep on AppData Folder

Detects suspicious sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Jun 22windows
Detectionhightest

Taskkill Symantec Endpoint Protection

Detects one of the possible scenarios for disabling Symantec Endpoint Protection. Symantec Endpoint Protection antivirus software services incorrectly implement the protected service mechanism. As a result, the NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM user can execute the taskkill /im command several times ccSvcHst.exe /f, thereby killing the process belonging to the service, and thus shutting down the service.

WindowsProcess Creation
Ilya Krestinichev+1Tue Sep 13windows
Detectionhightest

Taskmgr as LOCAL_SYSTEM

Detects the creation of taskmgr.exe process in context of LOCAL_SYSTEM

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sun Mar 18windows
Detectionlowtest

New Process Created Via Taskmgr.EXE

Detects the creation of a process via the Windows task manager. This might be an attempt to bypass UAC

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Mar 13windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious TSCON Start as SYSTEM

Detects a tscon.exe start as LOCAL SYSTEM

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Mar 17windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious RDP Redirect Using TSCON

Detects a suspicious RDP session redirect using tscon.exe

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Mar 17windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM interface

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Sep 13windows
Detectioncriticaltest

TrustedPath UAC Bypass Pattern

Detects indicators of a UAC bypass method by mocking directories

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 27windows
Detectionhightest

Bypass UAC via WSReset.exe

Detects use of WSReset.exe to bypass User Account Control (UAC). Adversaries use this technique to execute privileged processes.

WindowsProcess Creation
E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections+3Thu Oct 24windows
Detectionhightest

Chopper Webshell Process Pattern

Detects patterns found in process executions cause by China Chopper like tiny (ASPX) webshells

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Sat Oct 01windows
Detectionhightest

Webshell Hacking Activity Patterns

Detects certain parent child patterns found in cases in which a web shell is used to perform certain credential dumping or exfiltration activities on a compromised system

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Mar 17windows
Detectionhightest

Webshell Detection With Command Line Keywords

Detects certain command line parameters often used during reconnaissance activity via web shells

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+5Sun Jan 01windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Process By Web Server Process

Detects potentially suspicious processes being spawned by a web server process which could be the result of a successfully placed web shell or exploitation

WindowsProcess Creation
Thomas Patzke+4Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

Webshell Tool Reconnaissance Activity

Detects processes spawned from web servers (PHP, Tomcat, IIS, etc.) that perform reconnaissance looking for the existence of popular scripting tools (perl, python, wget) on the system via the help commands

WindowsProcess Creation
Cian Heasley+1Wed Jul 22windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Child Process Of Wermgr.EXE

Detects suspicious Windows Error Reporting manager (wermgr.exe) child process

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Oct 14windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Execution Location Of Wermgr.EXE

Detects suspicious Windows Error Reporting manager (wermgr.exe) execution location.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Oct 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Enumerate All Information With Whoami.EXE

Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" with the "/all" flag

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Dec 04windows
Detectionhightest

Whoami.EXE Execution From Privileged Process

Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" by privileged accounts that are often abused by threat actors

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Jan 28windows
Detectionmediumtest

Whoami.EXE Execution With Output Option

Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" with the "/FO" flag to choose CSV as output format or with redirection options to export the results to a file for later use.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Feb 28windows
Detectionmediumtest

Whoami.EXE Execution Anomaly

Detects the execution of whoami.exe with suspicious parent processes.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Aug 12windows
Detectionhightest

Security Privileges Enumeration Via Whoami.EXE

Detects a whoami.exe executed with the /priv command line flag instructing the tool to show all current user privileges. This is often used after a privilege escalation attempt.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed May 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Install New Package Via Winget Local Manifest

Detects usage of winget to install applications via manifest file. Adversaries can abuse winget to download payloads remotely and execute them. The manifest option enables you to install an application by passing in a YAML file directly to the client. Winget can be used to download and install exe, msi or msix files later.

WindowsProcess Creation
Sreeman+2Tue Apr 21windows
Detectionmediumtest

Winrar Compressing Dump Files

Detects execution of WinRAR in order to compress a file with a ".dmp"/".dump" extension, which could be a step in a process of dump file exfiltration.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Jan 04windows
Detectionmediumtest

WinRAR Execution in Non-Standard Folder

Detects a suspicious WinRAR execution in a folder which is not the default installation folder

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Wed Nov 17windows
Detectionhightest

New ActiveScriptEventConsumer Created Via Wmic.EXE

Detects WMIC executions in which an event consumer gets created. This could be used to establish persistence

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Jun 25windows
Detectionmediumtest

New Process Created Via Wmic.EXE

Detects new process creation using WMIC via the "process call create" flag

WindowsProcess Creation
Michael Haag+3Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

Hardware Model Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of WMIC with the "csproduct" which is used to obtain information such as hardware models and vendor information

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Feb 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Product Class Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of WMIC in order to get a list of firewall, antivirus and antispywware products. Adversaries often enumerate security products installed on a system to identify security controls and potential ways to evade detection or disable protection mechanisms. This information helps them plan their next attack steps and choose appropriate techniques to bypass security measures.

WindowsProcess Creation
Michael Haag+4Tue Feb 14windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Remote SquiblyTwo Technique Execution

Detects potential execution of the SquiblyTwo technique that leverages Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious code remotely. This technique bypasses application whitelisting by using wmic.exe to process malicious XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) scripts that can contain embedded JScript or VBScript. The attack typically works by fetching XSL content from a remote source (using HTTP/HTTPS) and executing it with full trust privileges directly in memory, avoiding disk-based detection mechanisms. This is a common LOLBin (Living Off The Land Binary) technique used for defense evasion and code execution.

WindowsProcess Creation
Markus Neis+2Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE

Detects WMIC executing "process call create" with suspicious calls to processes such as "rundll32", "regsrv32", etc.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Tampering With Security Products Via WMIC

Detects uninstallation or termination of security products using the WMIC utility

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Sat Jan 30windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious WmiPrvSE Child Process

Detects suspicious and uncommon child processes of WmiPrvSE

WindowsProcess Creation
Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel)+2Mon Aug 23windows
Detectioncriticaltest

WMI Backdoor Exchange Transport Agent

Detects a WMI backdoor in Exchange Transport Agents via WMI event filters

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Oct 11windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Dropper Script Execution Via WScript/CScript/MSHTA

Detects wscript/cscript/mshta executions of scripts located in user directories

WindowsProcess Creation
Margaritis Dimitrios+4Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

Proxy Execution Via Wuauclt.EXE

Detects the use of the Windows Update Client binary (wuauclt.exe) for proxy execution.

WindowsProcess Creation
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+4Mon Oct 12windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Windows Update Agent Empty Cmdline

Detects suspicious Windows Update Agent activity in which a wuauclt.exe process command line doesn't contain any command line flags

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Feb 26windows
Detectioncriticaltest

Windows Credential Editor Registry

Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE)

WindowsRegistry Event
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Dec 31windows