Rule Library

Sigma Rules

1,414 rules found for "Nextron Systems"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Windows Service Tampering

Detects the usage of binaries such as 'net', 'sc' or 'powershell' in order to stop, pause, disable or delete critical or important Windows services such as AV, Backup, etc. As seen being used in some ransomware scripts

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+2Thu Sep 01windows
Detectionhighstable

Shadow Copies Deletion Using Operating Systems Utilities

Shadow Copies deletion using operating systems utilities

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+5Tue Oct 22windows
Detectionhightest

Windows Shell/Scripting Processes Spawning Suspicious Programs

Detects suspicious child processes of a Windows shell and scripting processes such as wscript, rundll32, powershell, mshta...etc.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Apr 06windows
Detectionmediumtest

Process Creation Using Sysnative Folder

Detects process creation events that use the Sysnative folder (common for CobaltStrike spawns)

WindowsProcess Creation
Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)Tue Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

System File Execution Location Anomaly

Detects the execution of a Windows system binary that is usually located in the system folder from an uncommon location.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+4Mon Nov 27windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious SYSTEM User Process Creation

Detects a suspicious process creation as SYSTEM user (suspicious program or command line parameter)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Dec 20windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Userinit Child Process

Detects a suspicious child process of userinit

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Jun 17windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Suspicious Velociraptor Child Process

Detects the suspicious use of the Velociraptor DFIR tool to execute other tools or download additional payloads, as seen in a campaign where it was abused for remote access and to stage further attacks.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 29windows
Detectionmediumtest

Weak or Abused Passwords In CLI

Detects weak passwords or often abused passwords (seen used by threat actors) via the CLI. An example would be a threat actor creating a new user via the net command and providing the password inline

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Sep 14windows
Detectionhightest

WhoAmI as Parameter

Detects a suspicious process command line that uses whoami as first parameter (as e.g. used by EfsPotato)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Nov 29windows
Detectionhightest

Terminal Service Process Spawn

Detects a process spawned by the terminal service server process (this could be an indicator for an exploitation of CVE-2019-0708)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed May 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Uncommon Svchost Parent Process

Detects an uncommon svchost parent process

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Aug 15windows
Detectionmediumtest

Permission Check Via Accesschk.EXE

Detects the usage of the "Accesschk" utility, an access and privilege audit tool developed by SysInternal and often being abused by attacker to verify process privileges

WindowsProcess Creation
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+3Tue Oct 13windows
Detectionmediumtest

Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer

Detects the execution of Sysinternals ADExplorer with the "-snapshot" flag in order to save a local copy of the active directory database. This can be used by attackers to extract data for Bloodhound, usernames for password spraying or use the meta data for social engineering. The snapshot doesn't contain password hashes but there have been cases, where administrators put passwords in the comment field.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Mar 14windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer

Detects the execution of Sysinternals ADExplorer with the "-snapshot" flag in order to save a local copy of the active directory database to a suspicious directory. This can be used by attackers to extract data for Bloodhound, usernames for password spraying or use the meta data for social engineering. The snapshot doesn't contain password hashes but there have been cases, where administrators put passwords in the comment field.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Mar 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Memory Dumping Activity Via LiveKD

Detects execution of LiveKD based on PE metadata or image name

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Mon May 15windows
Detectionhightest

Kernel Memory Dump Via LiveKD

Detects execution of LiveKD with the "-m" flag to potentially dump the kernel memory

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue May 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

Procdump Execution

Detects usage of the SysInternals Procdump utility

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 16windows
Detectionhightest

Potential SysInternals ProcDump Evasion

Detects uses of the SysInternals ProcDump utility in which ProcDump or its output get renamed, or a dump file is moved or copied to a different name

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Jan 11windows
Detectionhighstable

Potential LSASS Process Dump Via Procdump

Detects potential credential harvesting attempts through LSASS memory dumps using ProcDump. This rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns that combine memory dump flags (-ma, -mm, -mp) with LSASS-related process markers. LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) contains sensitive authentication data including plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets in memory. Attackers commonly dump LSASS memory to extract credentials for lateral movement and privilege escalation.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Oct 30windows
Detectionhightest

PsExec/PAExec Escalation to LOCAL SYSTEM

Detects suspicious commandline flags used by PsExec and PAExec to escalate a command line to LOCAL_SYSTEM rights

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Nov 23windows
Detectionhightest

Potential PsExec Remote Execution

Detects potential psexec command that initiate execution on a remote systems via common commandline flags used by the utility

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Feb 28windows
Detectionmediumtest

PsExec Service Execution

Detects launch of the PSEXESVC service, which means that this system was the target of a psexec remote execution

WindowsProcess Creation
Thomas Patzke+2Mon Jun 12windows
Detectionhightest

PsExec Service Child Process Execution as LOCAL SYSTEM

Detects suspicious launch of the PSEXESVC service on this system and a sub process run as LOCAL_SYSTEM (-s), which means that someone remotely started a command on this system running it with highest privileges and not only the privileges of the login user account (e.g. the administrator account)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 21windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Use of PsLogList

Detects usage of the PsLogList utility to dump event log in order to extract admin accounts and perform account discovery or delete events logs

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Sat Dec 18windows
Detectionmediumtest

Sysinternals PsService Execution

Detects usage of Sysinternals PsService which can be abused for service reconnaissance and tampering

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jun 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

Sysinternals PsSuspend Execution

Detects usage of Sysinternals PsSuspend which can be abused to suspend critical processes

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Mar 23windows
Detectionhightest

Sysinternals PsSuspend Suspicious Execution

Detects suspicious execution of Sysinternals PsSuspend, where the utility is used to suspend critical processes such as AV or EDR to bypass defenses

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Mar 23windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Privilege Escalation To LOCAL SYSTEM

Detects unknown program using commandline flags usually used by tools such as PsExec and PAExec to start programs with SYSTEM Privileges

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Sat May 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Sysmon Configuration Update

Detects updates to Sysmon's configuration. Attackers might update or replace the Sysmon configuration with a bare bone one to avoid monitoring without shutting down the service completely

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Mar 09windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Binary Impersonating Sysinternals Tools

Detects binaries that use the same name as legitimate sysinternals tools to evade detection. This rule looks for the execution of binaries that are named similarly to Sysinternals tools. Adversary may rename their malicious tools as legitimate Sysinternals tools to evade detection.

WindowsProcess Creation
François Hubaut+1Mon Dec 20windows
Detectionmediumtest

Sysprep on AppData Folder

Detects suspicious sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Jun 22windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Signing Bypass Via Windows Developer Features

Detects when a user enable developer features such as "Developer Mode" or "Application Sideloading". Which allows the user to install untrusted packages.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Jan 11windows
Detectionlowtest

Compressed File Creation Via Tar.EXE

Detects execution of "tar.exe" in order to create a compressed file. Adversaries may abuse various utilities to compress or encrypt data before exfiltration.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Dec 19windows
Detectionhightest

Taskkill Symantec Endpoint Protection

Detects one of the possible scenarios for disabling Symantec Endpoint Protection. Symantec Endpoint Protection antivirus software services incorrectly implement the protected service mechanism. As a result, the NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM user can execute the taskkill /im command several times ccSvcHst.exe /f, thereby killing the process belonging to the service, and thus shutting down the service.

WindowsProcess Creation
Ilya Krestinichev+1Tue Sep 13windows
Detectionhightest

Taskmgr as LOCAL_SYSTEM

Detects the creation of taskmgr.exe process in context of LOCAL_SYSTEM

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sun Mar 18windows
Detectionlowtest

New Process Created Via Taskmgr.EXE

Detects the creation of a process via the Windows task manager. This might be an attempt to bypass UAC

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Mar 13windows
Detectionmediumtest

New Virtual Smart Card Created Via TpmVscMgr.EXE

Detects execution of "Tpmvscmgr.exe" to create a new virtual smart card.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jun 15windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious TSCON Start as SYSTEM

Detects a tscon.exe start as LOCAL SYSTEM

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Mar 17windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious RDP Redirect Using TSCON

Detects a suspicious RDP session redirect using tscon.exe

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sat Mar 17windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using ChangePK and SLUI

Detects an UAC bypass that uses changepk.exe and slui.exe (UACMe 61)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using Disk Cleanup

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using scheduled tasks and variable expansion of cleanmgr.exe (UACMe 34)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhighstable

CMSTP UAC Bypass via COM Object Access

Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects (e.g. UACMe ID of 41, 43, 58 or 65)

WindowsProcess Creation
Nik Seetharaman+1Wed Jul 31windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Tools Using ComputerDefaults

Detects tools such as UACMe used to bypass UAC with computerdefaults.exe (UACMe 59)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Tue Aug 31windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using Consent and Comctl32 - Process

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll (UACMe 22)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 23windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using DismHost

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using DismHost DLL hijacking (UACMe 63)

WindowsProcess Creation
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)Mon Aug 30windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass Using Event Viewer RecentViews

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Event Viewer RecentViews

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Nov 22windows
Detectionhightest

UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil

Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM interface

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Sep 13windows