Rule Library

Sigma Rules

Browse detections by severity and log source, with YAML and sample events one click away.

3,782Total
3,164Detection
474Emerging
141Hunting
3,782 rulesInspect a rule without leaving your results.
lowtestThreat Hunt

System Drawing DLL Load

Detects processes loading "System.Drawing.ni.dll". This could be an indicator of potential Screen Capture.

windowsimage_load
2023-02-22
lowtestThreat Hunt

Task Scheduler DLL Loaded By Application Located In Potentially Suspicious Location

Detects the loading of the "taskschd.dll" module from a process that located in a potentially suspicious or uncommon directory. The loading of this DLL might indicate that the application have the capability to create a scheduled task via the "Schedule.Service" COM object. Investigation of the loading application and its behavior is required to determining if its malicious.

windowsimage_load
2024-09-02
lowtestThreat Hunt

Microsoft Word Add-In Loaded

Detects Microsoft Word loading an Add-In (.wll) file which can be used by threat actors for initial access or persistence.

windowsimage_load
2024-07-10
lowexperimentalThreat Hunt

Signed DLL Loaded With Missing PE Version Metadata

Detects the loading of a digitally signed DLL whose PE version-info resource is entirely missing. Legitimate signed DLLs from reputable vendors often carry populated metadata fields (Description, Company, Product, OriginalFileName, FileVersion). An attacker who signs a purpose-built or hollowed DLL with a stolen, mis-issued, or cheaply purchased code-signing certificate will often omit these fields, producing a valid signature with no accompanying version info. This pattern is observed in DLL side-loading, search-order hijacking, and certificate-abuse campaigns where signing is used purely to satisfy security-product trust checks. Hunting Hypothesis: - Investigate the signing certificate (issuer, subject, validity window, thumbprint) for disposable or recently issued CAs and cross-reference against known threat-actor certificates. - Examine the DLL's on-disk path relative to the loading process — paths outside standard system directories or inside application folders susceptible to search-order hijacking are high-priority leads. - Correlate with the parent process context; DLLs loaded into high-value targets such as lsass.exe, svchost.exe, or browser processes warrant immediate escalation. Note: The "selection_metadata_null" selection matches fields with a null value. Some backends may interpret null field conditions as "field does not exist" rather than "field has a null value", which would change the detection semantics. If your backend does not support or support null-value matching in different ways than expected, you may need to adjust the rule logic accordingly or remove the "selection_metadata_null" condition.

windowsimage_load
2026-05-21