Rule Library

Sigma Rules

60 rules found for "Tim Shelton"

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionhightest

Account Created And Deleted Within A Close Time Frame

Detects when an account was created and deleted in a short period of time.

Azureauditlogs
Mark Morowczynski+2Thu Aug 11cloud
Detectionmediumtest

Privileged Account Creation

Detects when a new admin is created.

Azureauditlogs
Mark Morowczynski+2Thu Aug 11cloud
Detectionlowtest

Measurable Increase Of Successful Authentications

Detects when successful sign-ins increased by 10% or greater.

Azuresigninlogs
Mark Morowczynski+2Thu Aug 11cloud
Detectionlowstable

Cleartext Protocol Usage

Ensure that all account usernames and authentication credentials are transmitted across networks using encrypted channels. Ensure that an encryption is used for all sensitive information in transit. Ensure that an encrypted channels is used for all administrative account access.

Firewall
Alexandr Yampolskyi+2Tue Mar 26network
Detectionhightest

First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe - Zeek

This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes

Zeek (Bro)smb_files
Samir Bousseaden+1Thu Apr 02network
Detectionhightest

Suspicious PsExec Execution - Zeek

detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one

Zeek (Bro)smb_files
Samir Bousseaden+1Thu Apr 02network
Detectionhightest

Bitsadmin to Uncommon TLD

Detects Bitsadmin connections to domains with uncommon TLDs

Proxy Log
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Thu Mar 07web
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious User-Agents Related To Recon Tools

Detects known suspicious (default) user-agents related to scanning/recon tools

Web Server Log
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Jul 19web
Detectionhightest

Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right

Backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSync to a regular user or machine account using Powerview\Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync Extended Right cmdlet, will allow to re-obtain the pwd hashes of any user/computer

Windowssecurity
Samir Bousseaden+4Wed Apr 03windows
Detectionmediumtest

Windows Network Access Suspicious desktop.ini Action

Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini remotely over network share, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.

Windowssecurity
Tim Shelton (HAWK.IO)Mon Dec 06windows
Detectionmediumtest

SCM Database Privileged Operation

Detects non-system users performing privileged operation os the SCM database

Windowssecurity
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Thu Aug 15windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Remote Logon with Explicit Credentials

Detects suspicious processes logging on with explicit credentials

Windowssecurity
oscd.community+3Mon Oct 05windows
Detectionhightest

Sysmon Application Crashed

Detects application popup reporting a failure of the Sysmon service

Windowssystem
Tim SheltonTue Apr 26windows
Detectionmediumtest

NTLMv1 Logon Between Client and Server

Detects the reporting of NTLMv1 being used between a client and server. NTLMv1 is insecure as the underlying encryption algorithms can be brute-forced by modern hardware.

Windowssystem
Tim Shelton+1Tue Apr 26windows
Detectionhightest

Important Windows Eventlog Cleared

Detects the clearing of one of the Windows Core Eventlogs. e.g. caused by "wevtutil cl" command execution

Windowssystem
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+2Tue May 17windows
Detectionhightest

KrbRelayUp Service Installation

Detects service creation from KrbRelayUp tool used for privilege escalation in Windows domain environments where LDAP signing is not enforced (the default settings)

Windowssystem
Sittikorn S+1Wed May 11windows
Detectionmediumtest

ADSI-Cache File Creation By Uncommon Tool

Detects the creation of an "Active Directory Schema Cache File" (.sch) file by an uncommon tool.

WindowsFile Event
xknow+1Sun Mar 24windows
Detectionmediumtest

Files With System Process Name In Unsuspected Locations

Detects the creation of an executable with a system process name in folders other than the system ones (System32, SysWOW64, etc.). It is highly recommended to perform an initial baseline before using this rule in production.

WindowsFile Event
Sander Wiebing+2Tue May 26windows
Detectionhightest

WScript or CScript Dropper - File

Detects a file ending in jse, vbe, js, vba, vbs, wsf, wsh written by cscript.exe or wscript.exe

WindowsFile Event
Tim SheltonMon Jan 10windows
Detectionmediumtest

Desktop.INI Created by Uncommon Process

Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.

WindowsFile Event
Maxime Thiebaut+1Thu Mar 19windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Webshell Creation On Static Website

Detects the creation of files with certain extensions on a static web site. This can be indicative of potential uploads of a web shell.

WindowsFile Event
Beyu Denis+3Tue Oct 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

PowerShell Core DLL Loaded By Non PowerShell Process

Detects loading of essential DLLs used by PowerShell by non-PowerShell process. Detects behavior similar to meterpreter's "load powershell" extension.

WindowsImage Load (DLL)
Tom Kern+5Thu Nov 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Office Application Initiated Network Connection To Non-Local IP

Detects an office application (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) that initiate a network connection to a non-private IP addresses. This rule aims to detect traffic similar to one seen exploited in CVE-2021-42292. This rule will require an initial baseline and tuning that is specific to your organization.

WindowsNetwork Connection
Christopher Peacock+4Wed Nov 10windows
Detectionmediumtest

Alternate PowerShell Hosts Pipe

Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe

WindowsNamed Pipe Created
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Thu Sep 12windows
Detectionhightest

Remote PowerShell Session (PS Module)

Detects remote PowerShell sessions

WindowsPowerShell Module
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Sat Aug 10windows
Detectionhightest

Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ScriptBlock

Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks

WindowsPowerShell Script
Sean Metcalf+10Sun Mar 05windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious PowerShell WindowStyle Option

Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden

WindowsPowerShell Script
François Hubaut+1Wed Oct 20windows
Detectionhightest

Tamper Windows Defender - ScriptBlockLogging

Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of Windows Defender ATP or set default actions to allow.

WindowsPowerShell Script
François Hubaut+5Sun Jan 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potential Direct Syscall of NtOpenProcess

Detects potential calls to NtOpenProcess directly from NTDLL.

WindowsProcess Access
Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)+1Wed Jul 28windows
Detectionhightest

Potential CommandLine Path Traversal Via Cmd.EXE

Detects potential path traversal attempt via cmd.exe. Could indicate possible command/argument confusion/hijacking

WindowsProcess Creation
xknow+1Thu Jun 11windows
Detectionhightest

HackTool - Mimikatz Execution

Detection well-known mimikatz command line arguments

WindowsProcess Creation
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+3Tue Oct 22windows
Detectionmediumtest

Password Provided In Command Line Of Net.EXE

Detects a when net.exe is called with a password in the command line

WindowsProcess Creation
Tim Shelton (HAWK.IO)Thu Dec 09windows
Detectionmediumtest

ConvertTo-SecureString Cmdlet Usage Via CommandLine

Detects usage of the "ConvertTo-SecureString" cmdlet via the commandline. Which is fairly uncommon and could indicate potential suspicious activity

WindowsProcess Creation
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+3Sun Oct 11windows
Detectionhightest

Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands

Detects the presence of reversed PowerShell commands in the CommandLine. This is often used as a method of obfuscation by attackers

WindowsProcess Creation
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+3Sun Oct 11windows
Detectionhightest

Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation

Detects the PowerShell command lines with special characters

WindowsProcess Creation
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+3Thu Oct 15windows
Detectionlowtest

Potential Encoded PowerShell Patterns In CommandLine

Detects specific combinations of encoding methods in PowerShell via the commandline

WindowsProcess Creation
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+3Sun Oct 11windows
Detectionmediumtest

Potentially Suspicious Powershell Script Execution From Temp Folder

Detects a potentially suspicious powershell script executions from temporary folder

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+2Wed Jul 14windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious XOR Encoded PowerShell Command

Detects presence of a potentially xor encoded powershell command

WindowsProcess Creation
Sami Ruohonen+6Wed Sep 05windows
Detectionhightest

SafeBoot Registry Key Deleted Via Reg.EXE

Detects execution of "reg.exe" commands with the "delete" flag on safe boot registry keys. Often used by attacker to prevent safeboot execution of security products

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Aug 08windows
Detectionmediumtest

Rundll32 Execution With Uncommon DLL Extension

Detects the execution of rundll32 with a command line that doesn't contain a common extension

WindowsProcess Creation
Tim Shelton+2Thu Jan 13windows
Detectionmediumtest

Suspicious Copy From or To System Directory

Detects a suspicious copy operation that tries to copy a program from system (System32, SysWOW64, WinSxS) directories to another on disk. Often used to move LOLBINs such as 'certutil' or 'desktopimgdownldr' to a different location with a different name in order to bypass detections based on locations.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+3Fri Jul 03windows
Detectionmediumtest

Elevated System Shell Spawned From Uncommon Parent Location

Detects when a shell program such as the Windows command prompt or PowerShell is launched with system privileges from a uncommon parent location.

WindowsProcess Creation
François Hubaut+1Mon Dec 05windows
Detectionhightest

Process Execution From A Potentially Suspicious Folder

Detects a potentially suspicious execution from an uncommon folder.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

Windows Shell/Scripting Processes Spawning Suspicious Programs

Detects suspicious child processes of a Windows shell and scripting processes such as wscript, rundll32, powershell, mshta...etc.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Apr 06windows
Detectionhightest

Uncommon Userinit Child Process

Detects uncommon "userinit.exe" child processes, which could be a sign of uncommon shells or login scripts used for persistence.

WindowsProcess Creation
Tom Ueltschi+1Sat Jan 12windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Process By Web Server Process

Detects potentially suspicious processes being spawned by a web server process which could be the result of a successfully placed web shell or exploitation

WindowsProcess Creation
Thomas Patzke+4Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionmediumtest

New DLL Added to AppInit_DLLs Registry Key

DLLs that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry key HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll

WindowsRegistry Event
Ilyas Ochkov+2Fri Oct 25windows
Detectionmediumtest

Classes Autorun Keys Modification

Detects modification of Windows Registry Classes keys used for persistence. Adversaries modify these autostart extensibility points (ASEP) to execute malicious code when file types are opened or actions are performed. Various legitimate software also uses these keys. Currently, this rule only filters out known legitimate software paths, thus it is recommended to review and tune filters for your environment to reduce false positives before deploying to production.

WindowsRegistry Set
Victor Sergeev+6Fri Oct 25windows