Rule Library

Sigma Rules

1,709 rules found

3,731Total
3,132Detection
457Emerging
139Hunting
Detectionhightest

Potential Defense Evasion Activity Via Emoji Usage In CommandLine - 4

Detects the usage of emojis in the command line, this could be a sign of potential defense evasion activity.

WindowsProcess Creation
kostastsale+1Mon Dec 05windows
Detectionhightest

ETW Logging Tamper In .NET Processes Via CommandLine

Detects changes to environment variables related to ETW logging via the CommandLine. This could indicate potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.

WindowsProcess Creation
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g)+1Sat May 02windows
Detectionhightest

ETW Trace Evasion Activity

Detects command line activity that tries to clear or disable any ETW trace log which could be a sign of logging evasion.

WindowsProcess Creation
@neu5ron+3Fri Mar 22windows
Detectionhighstable

Suspicious Eventlog Clearing or Configuration Change Activity

Detects the clearing or configuration tampering of EventLog using utilities such as "wevtutil", "powershell" and "wmic". This technique were seen used by threat actors and ransomware strains in order to evade defenses.

WindowsProcess Creation
Ecco+4Thu Sep 26windows
Detectionhightest

Potentially Suspicious Execution From Parent Process In Public Folder

Detects a potentially suspicious execution of a parent process located in the "\Users\Public" folder executing a child process containing references to shell or scripting binaries and commandlines.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Feb 25windows
Detectionhightest

Process Execution From A Potentially Suspicious Folder

Detects a potentially suspicious execution from an uncommon folder.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Wed Jan 16windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Suspicious FileFix Execution Pattern

Detects suspicious FileFix execution patterns where users are tricked into running malicious commands through browser file upload dialog manipulation. This attack typically begins when users visit malicious websites impersonating legitimate services or news platforms, which may display fake CAPTCHA challenges or direct instructions to open file explorer and paste clipboard content. The clipboard content usually contains commands that download and execute malware, such as information stealing tools.

WindowsProcess Creation
0xFustang+1Mon Nov 24windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Reconnaissance Activity Via GatherNetworkInfo.VBS

Detects execution of the built-in script located in "C:\Windows\System32\gatherNetworkInfo.vbs". Which can be used to gather information about the target machine

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Wed Feb 08windows
Detectionhightest

Execution Of Non-Existing File

Checks whether the image specified in a process creation event is not a full, absolute path (caused by process ghosting or other unorthodox methods to start a process)

WindowsProcess Creation
Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)Thu Dec 09windows
Detectionhightest

Base64 MZ Header In CommandLine

Detects encoded base64 MZ header in the commandline

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Jul 12windows
Detectionhightest

Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine

Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline. As seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Sep 06windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Suspicious LNK Command-Line Padding with Whitespace Characters

Detects exploitation of LNK file command-line length discrepancy, where attackers hide malicious commands beyond the 260-character UI limit while the actual command-line argument field supports 4096 characters using whitespace padding (e.g., 0x20, 0x09-0x0D). Adversaries insert non-printable whitespace characters (e.g., Line Feed \x0A, Carriage Return \x0D) to pad the visible section of the LNK file, pushing malicious commands past the UI-visible boundary. The hidden payload, executed at runtime but invisible in Windows Explorer properties, enables stealthy execution and evasion—commonly used for social engineering attacks. This rule flags suspicious use of such padding observed in real-world attacks.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Wed Mar 19windows
Detectionhightest

LSASS Dump Keyword In CommandLine

Detects the presence of the keywords "lsass" and ".dmp" in the commandline, which could indicate a potential attempt to dump or create a dump of the lsass process.

WindowsProcess Creation
E.M. Anhaus+3Thu Oct 24windows
Detectionhightest

Non-privileged Usage of Reg or Powershell

Search for usage of reg or Powershell by non-privileged users to modify service configuration in registry

WindowsProcess Creation
Teymur Kheirkhabarov+2Mon Oct 05windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Process Patterns NTDS.DIT Exfil

Detects suspicious process patterns used in NTDS.DIT exfiltration

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Mar 11windows
Detectionhightest

Potentially Suspicious Call To Win32_NTEventlogFile Class

Detects usage of the WMI class "Win32_NTEventlogFile" in a potentially suspicious way (delete, backup, change permissions, etc.) from a PowerShell script

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 13windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Process Parents

Detects suspicious parent processes that should not have any children or should only have a single possible child program

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Mar 21windows
Detectionhightest

Potential PowerShell Execution Via DLL

Detects potential PowerShell execution from a DLL instead of the usual PowerShell process as seen used in PowerShdll. This detection assumes that PowerShell commands are passed via the CommandLine.

WindowsProcess Creation
Markus Neis+1Sat Aug 25windows
Detectionhightest

Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation

Detects a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indicate lateral movement or data staging activity.

WindowsProcess Creation
Tim Rauch+1Tue Sep 27windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Program Names

Detects suspicious patterns in program names or folders that are often found in malicious samples or hacktools

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Fri Feb 11windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Process Execution From Fake Recycle.Bin Folder

Detects process execution from a fake recycle bin folder, often used to avoid security solution.

WindowsProcess Creation
X__Junior (Nextron Systems)Wed Jul 12windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Redirection to Local Admin Share

Detects a suspicious output redirection to the local admins share, this technique is often found in malicious scripts or hacktool stagers

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Sun Jan 16windows
Detectionhightest

Potential Defense Evasion Via Right-to-Left Override

Detects the presence of the "u202+E" character, which causes a terminal, browser, or operating system to render text in a right-to-left sequence. This character is used as an obfuscation and masquerading techniques by adversaries to trick users into opening malicious files.

WindowsProcess Creation
Micah Babinski+2Wed Feb 15windows
Detectionhightest

Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder

Detects suspicious script execution from suspicious directories or folders accessible by environment variables that may indicate malware activity. Script interpreters (cscript, wscript, mshta, powershell) executing from folders like Temp, Public, or user profile directories may suggest attempts to evade detection or execute malicious scripts.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Feb 08windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Script Interpreter Spawning Credential Scanner - Windows

Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog, gitleaks). This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Tue Nov 25windows
Detectionhightest

Sensitive File Access Via Volume Shadow Copy Backup

Detects a command that accesses the VolumeShadowCopy in order to extract sensitive files such as the Security or SAM registry hives or the AD database (ntds.dit)

WindowsProcess Creation
Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Aug 09windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious New Service Creation

Detects creation of a new service via "sc" command or the powershell "new-service" cmdlet with suspicious binary paths

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 14windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Service Binary Directory

Detects a service binary running in a suspicious directory

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Mar 09windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Windows Service Tampering

Detects the usage of binaries such as 'net', 'sc' or 'powershell' in order to stop, pause, disable or delete critical or important Windows services such as AV, Backup, etc. As seen being used in some ransomware scripts

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)+2Thu Sep 01windows
Detectionhighstable

Shadow Copies Deletion Using Operating Systems Utilities

Shadow Copies deletion using operating systems utilities

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+5Tue Oct 22windows
Detectionhightest

Windows Shell/Scripting Processes Spawning Suspicious Programs

Detects suspicious child processes of a Windows shell and scripting processes such as wscript, rundll32, powershell, mshta...etc.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Fri Apr 06windows
Detectionhightest

System File Execution Location Anomaly

Detects the execution of a Windows system binary that is usually located in the system folder from an uncommon location.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+4Mon Nov 27windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious SYSTEM User Process Creation

Detects a suspicious process creation as SYSTEM user (suspicious program or command line parameter)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Mon Dec 20windows
Detectionhightest

Tasks Folder Evasion

The Tasks folder in system32 and syswow64 are globally writable paths. Adversaries can take advantage of this and load or influence any script hosts or ANY .NET Application in Tasks to load and execute a custom assembly into cscript, wscript, regsvr32, mshta, eventvwr

WindowsProcess Creation
SreemanMon Jan 13windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Suspicious Velociraptor Child Process

Detects the suspicious use of the Velociraptor DFIR tool to execute other tools or download additional payloads, as seen in a campaign where it was abused for remote access and to stage further attacks.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)Fri Aug 29windows
Detectionhightest

WhoAmI as Parameter

Detects a suspicious process command line that uses whoami as first parameter (as e.g. used by EfsPotato)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Mon Nov 29windows
Detectionhightest

Execution via WorkFolders.exe

Detects using WorkFolders.exe to execute an arbitrary control.exe

WindowsProcess Creation
Maxime ThiebautThu Oct 21windows
Detectionhightest

Suspect Svchost Activity

It is extremely abnormal for svchost.exe to spawn without any CLI arguments and is normally observed when a malicious process spawns the process and injects code into the process memory space.

WindowsProcess Creation
David BurkettSat Dec 28windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Process Masquerading As SvcHost.EXE

Detects a suspicious process that is masquerading as the legitimate "svchost.exe" by naming its binary "svchost.exe" and executing from an uncommon location. Adversaries often disguise their malicious binaries by naming them after legitimate system processes like "svchost.exe" to evade detection.

WindowsProcess Creation
Swachchhanda Shrawan PoudelWed Aug 07windows
Detectionhightest

Terminal Service Process Spawn

Detects a process spawned by the terminal service server process (this could be an indicator for an exploitation of CVE-2019-0708)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Wed May 22windows
Detectionhighexperimental

Uncommon Svchost Command Line Parameter

Detects instances of svchost.exe running with an unusual or uncommon command line parameter by excluding known legitimate or common patterns. This could point at a file masquerading as svchost, a process injection, or hollowing of a legitimate svchost instance.

WindowsProcess Creation
Liran RavichFri Nov 14windows
Detectionhightest

Suspicious Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer

Detects the execution of Sysinternals ADExplorer with the "-snapshot" flag in order to save a local copy of the active directory database to a suspicious directory. This can be used by attackers to extract data for Bloodhound, usernames for password spraying or use the meta data for social engineering. The snapshot doesn't contain password hashes but there have been cases, where administrators put passwords in the comment field.

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue Mar 14windows
Detectionhightest

Kernel Memory Dump Via LiveKD

Detects execution of LiveKD with the "-m" flag to potentially dump the kernel memory

WindowsProcess Creation
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)Tue May 16windows
Detectionhightest

Potential SysInternals ProcDump Evasion

Detects uses of the SysInternals ProcDump utility in which ProcDump or its output get renamed, or a dump file is moved or copied to a different name

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Jan 11windows
Detectionhighstable

Potential LSASS Process Dump Via Procdump

Detects potential credential harvesting attempts through LSASS memory dumps using ProcDump. This rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns that combine memory dump flags (-ma, -mm, -mp) with LSASS-related process markers. LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) contains sensitive authentication data including plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets in memory. Attackers commonly dump LSASS memory to extract credentials for lateral movement and privilege escalation.

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Tue Oct 30windows
Detectionhightest

PsExec/PAExec Escalation to LOCAL SYSTEM

Detects suspicious commandline flags used by PsExec and PAExec to escalate a command line to LOCAL_SYSTEM rights

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Nov 23windows
Detectionhightest

Potential PsExec Remote Execution

Detects potential psexec command that initiate execution on a remote systems via common commandline flags used by the utility

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)+1Tue Feb 28windows
Detectionhightest

PsExec Service Child Process Execution as LOCAL SYSTEM

Detects suspicious launch of the PSEXESVC service on this system and a sub process run as LOCAL_SYSTEM (-s), which means that someone remotely started a command on this system running it with highest privileges and not only the privileges of the login user account (e.g. the administrator account)

WindowsProcess Creation
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)Thu Jul 21windows